








TOWARDS A CONCERT OF ASIA? A PROPOSED 




The rise of China, both economically and militarily, is widely 
perceived as threatening several of China’s Asian neighbors and as 
undermining the United States’ influence in East Asia.  The 
evidence does indeed show that an arms race is beginning to build 
up in East Asia, and that some of China’s neighbors may be moving 
to balance against it.  Warning of the dangers of these trends, the 
distinguished Australian strategic analyst Hugh White urges a 
diplomatic effort to create a power-sharing arrangement or 
“Concert of Asia” that would defuse these tensions and maintain 
peace and security in the region.  Modeled on the nineteenth 
century “Concert of Europe” that arose in the wake of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and different in kind from a 
“balance of power” system, the proposed Concert of Asia would 
consist of four leading Asian or Pacific Great Powers—the United 
States, China, Japan and, eventually, India.   
 
White fully acknowledges the inherent difficulties in creating such a 
Concert.  But his proposal is even more problematic than he 
believes.  Concert systems arise after major, counter-hegemonic 
wars and survive for about as long as the defeated hegemon is felt 
to represent a threat.  Neither of these conditions exists in East Asia.  
If the peace of East Asia holds at all, it will likely be through a 
fragile balance of power instead.  But such a balance could easily 
tip over into war.   
 
Nonetheless, confidence-building measures that could eventually 
lead to something like a Concert system might conceivably be 
feasible even at the present time.  This paper raises and explores the 
possibility of demilitarizing certain strategically sensitive areas in 
Asia, such as the South China Sea, as a prelude to more intensive 
Great Power co-operation in the region.   
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The rise of China is the most important political fact of the 
early twenty first century. 1  China’s growth since the end of the 
Maoist Era and the start of its pro-market policies in 1979 has been 
explosive.  Accompanying those developments has been the equally 
stunning rise in China’s global prestige and influence and its 
emergence as a major military power.  China’s relationship with the 
United States has also changed dramatically in that interval: so 
symbiotic had the two nations become on economic and other levels 
that in 2007, Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick coined the term 
“Chimerica” to describe the relationship.2   
 But China’s spectacular rise has also had its unnerving 
aspects. Scholars, diplomats and policy analysts have been debating 
what China’s roles as both a significant military and a trade power 
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1 For a comprehensively documented account of the rise of China, see MARTIN JACQUES, 
WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD:  THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A 
NEW GLOBAL ORDER (2d ed. 2012). See also THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, THE CHINA 
CHALLENGE:  SHAPING THE CHOICES OF A RISING POWER (2015) [hereinafter, Christensen, 
China Challenge]. But see TIMOTHY BEARDSON, STUMBLING GIANT:  THE THREATS TO 
CHINA’S FUTURE (2013).   For a Chinese perspective, see generally ZHANG WEIWEI, THE 
CHINA WAVE:  RISE OF A CIVILIZATION STATE (2012).  For a brief review of different 
perspectives on the durability and consequences of China’s rise, see generally HENRY 
KISSINGER ET AL., DOES THE 21ST CENTURY BELONG TO CHINA?  KISSINGER AND ZAKARIA VS. 
FERGUSON AND LEE: The Monk Debate on China (Rudyard Griffiths & Patrick Luciani eds., 
2011) and CHRISTOPHER A. FORD, THE MIND OF EMPIRE: CHINA’S HISTORY AND MODERN 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 7-8 (2015).  For two notable analyses of the contradictory responses 
of American policy-makers and scholars toward a rising China, compare Thomas J. 
Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy 
toward East Asia, 31 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 81 (Summer, 2006) with Aaron L. 
Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, 30 INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY, 7 (Fall, 2005).   
2 See Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, Chimerica and the Global Asset Market Boom, 
10 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, 215 (2007), available at http://www.strongwind.com.hk/pdfs 
/TuiJian/ChimericaAssetBoom.pdf.  “Chimerica” stood for a global economic order based 
on the combination of China’s export-led growth and United States over-consumption.  
Thus, Ferguson and Schularick invited their readers to conceptualize the two nations as 
having “one economy called Chimerica: the sum of China, the world’s most rapidly 
growing emerging market, and America, the world’s most financially advanced developed 
economy. Chimerica accounts for only 13% of the world’s land surface, but a quarter of its 
population and fully a third its GDP. What is more noteworthy, it has accounted for over 
60% of the cumulative growth in world GDP over the past five years.” Id. at 228.  But only 
two years later, the authors pronounced Chimerica dead, as a casualty of the Western 
financial crisis of 2008-09.  See Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, The End of 
Chimerica (Harvard Business School, Working Paper No. 10-037, 2009), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-037.pdf. 
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means for the stability of East Asia and the Pacific Rim.  Is China 
creating a new security environment in East Asia and the world that 
is dangerous for its near neighbors?  Is China seeking to 
overshadow its neighbors, become the undisputed regional hegemon 
and supersede the United States as the dominant power in the area?  
Will China seek, in time, to create a modernized form of the “tribute 
system,” the way in which China managed its relations with foreign 
countries for two millennia?3  Is a “hierarchical” understanding of 
the world order, in which China holds pride of place, imprinted (so 
to say) on China’s foreign policy?4  Are the United States and China 
                                                 
3  For a capsule description, see Yongjin Zhang, The Tribute System, OXFORD 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (2013), available at http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/ 
document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0069.xml.  There is an extensive 
literature on the Chinese tribute system or, perhaps better, “Sinosphere.”  (The term 
“tribute system” is a Western construct; there is no Chinese word for it.)  See, e.g., Ford, 
supra note 1, at 94-100; ANDREW PHILLIPS, WAR, RELIGION AND EMPIRE:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORDERS, 149-260 (2011); Yongjin Zhang & Barry 
Buzan, The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice, 8 CHINESE 
JOURNAL OF INT’L POLITICS 1 (2012); Zhang Feng, Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: 
Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics, 2 CHINESE J. OF 
INT’L POLITICS 545 (2009) , and compare Yuan-kang Wang, Harmony and War:  
Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics 145-51, 179-80 (2011) (threat or use of 
Chinese military force was crucial to maintaining and enforcing tributary system) with 
David C. Kang, East Asia Before the West:  Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute 54-106 
(2010) and David C. Kang, China Rising:  Peace, Power and Order in East Asia 23-49 
(2007) (arguing that the Chinese-dominated early modern East Asian system before 
Western ascendancy in the region was prevailingly stable and peaceful, that “tribute” 
consisted primarily of trade, that unlike the European system, East Asia did not see smaller 
states balancing against the hegemonic power, and that periods of Chinese weakness were 
more prone to lead to international conflict than its periods of strength).  For the suggestion 
that China may want the restoration of a modernized form of the tributary system, see 
Jacques, supra note 1, at 507-09; Ford, supra note 1, at 273.  Some contemporary Chinese 
thinkers may even be attempting to create the intellectual framework for such a restoration.  
See William A. Callahan, Chinese Visions of World Order:  Post-hegemonic or a New 
Hegemony?, 10 INT’L STUD. REV., 749 (2008); Ford, supra note 1, at 245-47.     
4 See Ford, supra note 1, at 57 (“the Chinese intellectual tradition is suffused with a monist 
political ideology that conceives of international order in fundamentally hierarchical terms 
and idealizes interstate order as tending toward a universal hegemony or actual empire.  
For this reason, it lacks a meaningful concept of coequal, legitimate sovereignties pursuant 
to which states may coexist over the long term in nonhierarchical relationships.”); id. at 
273 (“Chinese history provides no precedent for the stable, long-term coexistence of 
coequal sovereigns, and its traditional ideals of moral government and statecraft, at least, 
cannot even admit such a possibility.”).  By contrast, the “Westphalian” world order, which 
(Western) international law presupposes, is “pluralistic,” in that it assumes the existence of 
many, formally equal state sovereigns, and indeed may even make such pluralism 
normative. 
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on track for a major war? Are China and its Asian neighbors on 
such a track?5 
Even the most knowledgeable and authoritative experts 
disagree.  In a recent analysis by Robert Black and Ashley Tellis, 
published by the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States 
effort to integrate China into the liberal international order that the 
United States constructed after the Second World War is seen to be 
failing.  These authors contend that the United States now “needs a 
new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise 
of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.”6  
Among the core elements of this new strategy, the authors argue, 
must be “improving the capabilities of U.S. military forces to 
effectively project power all along the Asian rimlands despite any 
Chinese opposition.”7  For these analysts, “China is and will remain 
the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to 
come.  China’s rise thus far has already bred geopolitical, military, 
economic, and ideological challenges to U.S. power, U.S. allies, and 
the U.S.-dominated international order.”8   
On the other hand, Thomas Christensen, a former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
argues that “globalized economies, changes in military technologies, 
and the disincentives for territorial expansion have altered 
international politics since the early decades of the twentieth century, 
when a zero-sum view of politics still held sway.”9  More fully: 
 
The kinds of temptation that led to great power wars 
during the previous power transitions are much less 
prominent in Asia today than they were in the 
Western Hemisphere and Asia in the past.  
                                                 
5 See Jonathan Holslag, China’s Coming War With Asia 119 (2015) (“The deep, implicit 
driver of China’s Asia policy remains the maximization of power:  power to control the 
frontier lands, to secure the position of the Party as the legitimate political government, to 
protect China’s sovereignty, and to recover lost territory.”).   Holslag is at pains to 
emphasize that in his view, “[t]he main cause of China’s revisionism is not some sort of 
evil plot among its officials and leaders.  It is structural.”  Id. at 109.  In other words, 
China’s alleged revisionism is an outcome of the “security dilemma,” discussed infra, for 
which status quo powers such as the US and Japan are no less responsible than China, see 
id. at 169.    
6 ROBERT D. BLACKWILL & ASHLEY J. TELLIS, REVISING U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD 
CHINA, 4 (2015). 
7 Id. at 5. 
8 Id. at 5-6. 
9 Christensen, China Challenge, supra note 1, at 2. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/2
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Substantial changes in global economics and politics 
have made the current international system more 
robust than previous systems.  Broader economic 
trends have made territorial conquest of colonies less 
tempting, and changes in both economics and 
weaponry have decreased the need for invasion and 
conquest of either peer competitors or their smaller 
allies.  Furthermore, the institutions set up by the 
United States and its allies after World War II were 
beneficial not just to themselves but to all states 
willing to open up their economies to a rule-based 
global order. No country has benefited from that 
global order more than China, particularly since it 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.  
Since domestic stability is paramount for the 
[Chinese Communist Party] and the maintenance of 
stability depends in large part on economic growth, I 
can see few reasons why China would intentionally 
seek conflict with its trade and investment partners or 
undercut the institutional framework that has enabled 
its historic economic development.10   
 
 This article makes no attempt to resolve such disagreements.  
Instead, it argues that even if one judges a war between the United 
States and China to be unlikely (and even those holding a relatively 
benign view of future United States-China relations agree that a war 
between them is possible), it would be so catastrophic if war did 
take place that both nations must urgently take steps now to reduce 
or eliminate the risk of conflict.  In particular, the article examines 
in depth the fascinating proposal by the Australian international 
relations scholar, Hugh White, that the United States, China, Japan 
and (eventually) India should be working together towards the 
establishment of a “Concert of Asia,” modeled on the Concert of 
Europe that the Great Powers erected after the Napoleonic Wars.11  
The Concert of Europe established an international system that 
preserved the peace on that continent for a generation or longer; 
                                                 
10 Id. at 40. 
11 See HUGH WHITE, THE CHINA CHOICE:  WHY WE SHOULD SHARE POWER (2012).  For a 
critique of White’s argument along different lines from mine, see Andrew Phillips, From 
the Age of Asymmetry to the Great Reconvergence: Securing Order in the Asian Century, 
65 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 94 (2011). 
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White’s proposed Concert of Asia is designed to do the same for our 
period, thus enabling both China and the rest of the world to adjust 
peaceably to the former’s new power and position. I argue that 
White’s proposal, though stimulating and attractive, simply cannot 
be realized in the existing conditions of East Asia: the main 
historical precedents for successful “concert” systems (post-
Napoleonic Europe and the post-Independence United States) tell 
too strongly against it.  However, the United States and its Allies, 
working together with China, can take realistic and plausible steps 
in the near term for conflict prevention.  This paper explores one 
such possible measure: the demilitarization of the South China Sea.    
 The paper is divided into five parts.  Part I is a general 
survey of the causes of China’s rise, the consequences that the rise 
of China has entailed or seems likely to entail, and the concerns that 
the United States and other States have felt in watching these 
developments.  Part II examines two possible strategies – balancing 
and containment – that are potential responses if China’s rise is 
viewed as a security threat.  Part III raises the question whether the 
pursuit of such strategies is creating a classic “security dilemma” in 
East Asia, threatening the peace of the region.  Part IV examines 
and evaluates White’s proposed “Concert of Asia.”  Part V puts 
forward a modest alternative to White’s more ambitious conception: 
a progressive series of confidence-building measures designed to 
reduce the risk of conflict in East Asia.   
 I write as a scholar and practitioner of international law, not 
as an international relations theorist (still less as a trained 
Sinologist).  Nonetheless, I make liberal use of the doctrines and 
insights of modern international relations theory.  In this, I follow 
many other contemporary writers on international law who have 
recognized the interest and value of international relations theory for 
our own subject.12 
                                                 
12  For a pioneering study, see generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International 
Relations Theory:  A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989).  
For Abbott’s later writings on the interrelationship of the two disciplines, see generally 
Kenneth W. Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law and Policy, 1 
J. INT’L L. & INT’L RELS. 9 (2005); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Kenneth W. Abbott, 
International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in 
Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361 (1999); Kenneth W. Abbott, Trust But Verify: 
The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International 
Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1 (1993).  Other international law scholars have also 
seized on the utility and relevance of international relations theory.  See, e.g., Anne-Marie 
Burley, Law and the Liberal Paradigm in International Relations Theory, 86 AM. SOC. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/2
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I.  The Rise of China:  Causes, Consequences and 
Concerns 
China has already become, by several measures, the second 
largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan; and it has overtaken 
the United States, or is poised to do so, by at least some metrics.  
China has enjoyed annual growth rates of 9-10% for thirty years; by 
contrast, the United States economy is growing at 3% or less 
annually.13  One study put the size of the Chinese economy in 2011 
                                                                                                               
INT’L L. PROC. 180 (1992); Jack Goldsmith, Book Review: Sovereignty, International 
Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STANFORD L. REV. 959 (2000); Niels Peterson, 
How Rational Is International Law?, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1247 (2009); Eric Posner & Alan 
Sykes, Optimal War and Jus ad Bellum, 93 GEO. L. J. 993 (2005); Eric Posner, A Theory of 
the Laws of War, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (2003); Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 291 (1999); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties:  A Synthesis of 
International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 139 (1996); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory in THE 
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993); Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, 
Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64 (2006); Fernando R. Teson, Realism 
and Kantianism in International Law, 96 AM. SOC. INT’L LAW. PROC. 113 (1992); John 
Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004).  For significant book-length studies, see 
generally ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1999); 
MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999); ANTONIA CHAYES & ABE CHAYES, THE 
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); 
JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANDREW T. 
GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); ERIC 
POSNER, PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009); and JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008).  For a useful survey of the subject, see 
generally Michael Byers, International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 612 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., 2008). 
13 To be sure, expert opinion is sharply divided as to whether China’s growth will continue, 
and if so, at what rate.  For a working paper co-authored by a former United States 
Secretary of the Treasury, see Lant Pritchett & Lawrence H. Summers, Asiaphoria meets 
regression to the mean (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 
20573, Oct. 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20573.pdf.  The authors 
argue that because regression to the mean is empirically the most salient feature of 
economic growth, it is likely that China’s rapid growth rate will tail off.  They also argue 
that high levels of state control and corruption in China along with high measures of 
authoritarian rule make a discontinuous decline in growth more likely than general 
experience would suggest.  Also raising the possibility that China may have entered into 
the “middle-income trap,” see CHRISTOPHER COKER, THE IMPROBABLE WAR:  CHINA, THE 
UNITED STATES & THE LOGIC OF GREAT POWER CONFLICT, 51 (2014).  And some analysts 
believe that China’s changing demographic patterns may inhibit future growth, as its 
population ages and the size of its workforce shrinks; in any event, China is said to have a 
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at 87% of that of the United States; even the more conservative 
view of the International Monetary Fund placed it at about half the 
size of the United States economy in 2012.14  The United States has 
been the largest economy in the world since the late nineteenth 
century; it will be a momentous—and, for the United States, 
possibly traumatic—event when China displaces it. 15   China’s 
transformation has also been astonishingly rapid:  “A country that 
was two-thirds rural two decades ago has now more than 130 cities 
with more than one million people each, compared to just 19 in 
1978. . . The increase in an urban population that now numbers 740 
million has run parallel to a surge in industry.  China last year 
churned out about eight times the crude steel and eighteen times the 
cars and trucks it did two decades ago.”16 
China is deploying its wealth to extend its cultural influence 
and “soft power.”17  A foreign tourist who arrives at Beijing Capital 
International Airport is likely to be awed by the scale, sophistication 
and modernity of the facility.  Nations sometimes use airports as a 
way of presenting themselves to foreign visitors—of projecting an 
image of themselves that they desire foreigners to see and accept.18  
                                                                                                               
much less favorable demographic profile than its rival, India.  See Gordon Chang, Coming 
Soon: China’s Demographic Doomsday, in THE NATIONAL INTEREST (August 10, 2015), 
available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/coming-soon-chinas-demographic-
doomsday-13534.  For a short survey of differing opinions among leading economists, see 
Chris Matthews, The Great China Growth Debate: Ripe for a slowdown or full speed 
ahead?, in FORTUNE (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://fortune.com/2014/11/05/china-
growth/.  For a broad, theoretical argument that China’s growth will plateau unless it 
transforms itself from being an “extractive” economy in which the Communist Party 
occupies a place of political and legal privilege, see DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, 
WHY NATIONS FAIL:  THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY, 437-43 (2013).  
14 See Linda Yueh, Is China About to Overtake the U.S. as the World’s Largest Economy?, 
BBC News: Business, April 30, 2014, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
27216705.  
15 Indeed, Americans may already have absorbed the fact.  According to the Pew Research 
Center, only 40% of Americans opined in 2014 that the United States was the world’s 
leading economic power. Pew Research Center, What Country is the World's Leading 
Economic Power? (2014), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/17 
/country/233/. And globally, a median of 49% across 44 countries (and 49% in the United 
States itself) responded that China has replaced or will replace the United States as the 
world’s leading superpower. Pew Research Center, Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance 
and Drones, but Limited Harm to America's Image (July 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/07/2014-07-14-Balance-of-Power.pdf.   
16 Chun Han Wong, China Blast Corrodes Faith in Leadership, in THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, AUG. 21, 2015, at A1.   
17 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POLICY 153, 154 (1990) (discussing the 
shift in importance of soft power after the end of the Cold War). 
18  For other cases in which the Chinese government has sought to make a statement 
through its public buildings, see ZHENG WANG, NEVER FORGET NATIONAL HUMILIATION: 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/2
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Certainly the impressive Ben Gurion Airport at Tel Aviv does that:  
the arriving or departing visitor comes away with the sense of the 
intimate and millennial ties of the Jewish people to the land of Israel.  
Beijing’s state-of-the-art airport conveys a different sense:  that of 
rising power, wealth and technological mastery.  And China is 
building an even newer airport, Beijing Daxing International Airport, 
due to be completed in 2017. 19   Since 2004, China has also 
established about 480 Confucius Institutes in dozens of countries 
throughout the world, in order to encourage the study of the Chinese 
language and the nation’s culture.20  China’s rapidly growing wealth, 
power and cultural influence were also vividly demonstrated at the 
2008 Olympics, hosted in Beijing, in which China proudly 
demonstrated its achievements to the world.21 
Economic power normally translates into political and 
military power, and that is also happening with China.  For the 
present, the United States and its allies hold global military primacy, 
insofar as that can be measured by defense spending.  The United 
States spends more on defense than all other major powers 
                                                                                                               
HISTORICAL MEMORY IN CHINESE POLITICS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS, 50-60 (2012).  On the 
significance of architecture to a state’s self-representation, see RAYMOND QUEK, 
Nationalism and Architecture, in NATIONALISM AND ARCHITECTURE, 1 (Raymond Quek, 
Darren Dean & Sarah Butler eds., 2012).  To illustrate, it has been argued that the 
monumental, neoclassical style widely used in government buildings in the 1930s (whether 
by liberal, fascist or communist regimes) reveals points of congruence among those 
regimes.  See WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THREE NEW DEALS:  REFLECTIONS ON 
ROOSEVELT’S AMERICA, MUSSOLINI’S ITALY, AND HITLER’S GERMANY, 1933-1939, at 1-11 
(2006).  
19 See World’s Biggest Airport Beijing with 200 million capacity, YOUTUBE, available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=coQ2Hki6zc4.   
20 See Confucius Institutes Worldwide, available at http://www.confucius.ucla.edu/about-
us/confucius-institutes-worldwide.  In general, the Chinese government has been providing 
official sponsorship for the revival of purportedly “Confucian” values and traditions.  See 
also LIONEL M. JENSEN, MANUFACTURING CONFUCIANISM: CHINESE TRADITIONS AND 
UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION, 11-14 (2003); Confucius Says, Xi Does, in THE ECONOMIST, July 
25, 2015, available at http://www.economist.com/news/china/21659753-communist-party-
turns-ancient-philosophy-support-confucius-says-xi-does?fsrc=nlw%7Chig%7C23-07-
2015%7CNA (“though the party has quietly been rehabilitating Confucius for some time, 
under Mr Xi the pace has quickened. In February 2014 he convened a “collective study” 
session of the ruling Politburo at which he said that traditional culture should act as a 
“wellspring” nourishing the party’s values. Official accounts of the session made no 
mention of Confucius, but party literature made it clear that the values Mr Xi spoke of—
such as benevolence, honesty and righteousness—were those espoused by the 
philosopher.”).  For the ebb and flow of “Confucianism” as a cultural influence in China, 
see Shaohua Hu, Confucianism and Contemporary Chinese Politics, 35 POLITICS & POL’Y 
136, 138-42 (2007). 
21 See Beijing Opening Ceremony, NBC SPORTS, available at http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=e_qeLewYUqg.   
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combined.  And the United States, Europe and Japan together 
accounted in 2010 for about two-thirds of global military spending.  
Nonetheless, a global turn in military power is well underway.   
An 89-page United States Department of Defense Report 
released in July 2015 claimed that China’s defense spending 
amounted to $165 billion in 2014.  (China maintained that the 
amount was $136 billion.22)  The Pentagon reported that “China’s 
military modernization has the potential to reduce core U.S. military 
technological advances” and that “China’s officially disclosed 
military budget grew at an average of 9.5 percent per year in 
inflation-adjusted terms from 2005 through 2014” – a growth rate 
that the Pentagon expects China to sustain for the foreseeable 
future.23 
The Pentagon analyzed the strategic objectives of China’s 
military build-up as follows: 
 
Since 2002, China’s leaders – including current President Xi 
Jinping -- have characterized the initial two decades of the 
21st century as a “period of strategic opportunity.” They 
assess that during this time, international conditions will be 
conducive to domestic development and expanding China’s 
“comprehensive national power,” a term that encapsulates 
all elements of state power, including economic capacity, 
military might, and diplomacy. China’s leaders anticipate 
that a successful expansion of comprehensive national power 
will serve the Chinese Communist Party’s overriding 
strategic objectives, which include  
 
 Perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule; 
 Sustaining economic growth and development;  
 Maintaining domestic political stability; 
 Defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
and 
 Securing China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, 
reacquiring regional preeminence. 
 
                                                 
22 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic 
of China 2015, at 49, (hereinafter “2015 Pentagon Report”) available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf.  
23 Id. at i. 
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Though there is debate in Chinese academic circles over 
whether China can sustain the period of strategic opportunity 
though this decade, Chinese leaders have continued to 
reiterate the importance of this “period” to achieving these 
key strategic objectives and are seeking to prolong it. 
 
China’s leaders routinely emphasize the goal of reaching 
critical economic and military benchmarks by 2020.24 
 
China’s military spending, though only a third that of the 
United States, is greater that of twenty-four neighboring Asian 
nations combined, including Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea, 
and Taiwan.25  Even accepting China’s official estimate that its 2014 
defense budget amounted to $136.3 billion, that amount still 
surpassed the combined total of $127.5 billion for Japan, India, 
South Korea and Taiwan.26  Or to offer another comparison, China’s 
defense budget is more than three times the size of India’s. 27  
Furthermore, although the United States military is considerably 
larger than China’s, the United States has global commitments, 
whereas China is (at present) concerned primarily with regional 
activity.28 
 
The Background to China’s Post-1978 Growth 
What makes China’s economic and military rise even more 
impressive is the fact that it has largely been achieved since 1978—
a period of less than forty years.29  Moreover, China’s progress must 
be seen against the backdrop of more than a century of invasion, 
war, famine and destruction.  China was fully “opened” to the 
                                                 
24 Id. at 21. 
25 Asian Nations Stock up on Weapons to Counter China's Might, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 13, 
2014, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/09/13/asia-pacific/asian-
nations-stock-up-on-weapons-to-counter-chinas-might/#.VBnxAP0o45s. For a brief review 
of the speed and scale of China’s military build-up, see Adam P. Liff & G. John Ikenberry, 
Racing Toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the 
Security Dilemma, 39 INT’L SEC. 52, 66-69 (2014).   
26 See 2015 Pentagon Report, supra note 22, at 50. 
27 Zachary Keck, China's Military Spending vs Asia's Military Spending, THE DIPLOMAT 
(Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chinas-military-spending-vs-
asias-military-spending/.  
28 More data can be found on the website of the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, available at http://www.sipri.org/research/security/china/publications and 
available at http://first.sipri.org/search?country=CHN&dataset=military-expenditure.   
29 See EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA (2013). 
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Western trade and intervention only after the two Opium Wars of 
the mid-nineteenth century (1839; 1860),30 and only entered into the 
Western “treaty” system at about that time. 31   China’s painful 
encounter with the West was also marked by episodes of popular 
resistance and humiliation, such as the Boxer Rebellion, which is 
still well-remembered in China;32 the Opium Wars;33 and the legal 
regime of “unequal treaties” that the West imposed upon it.34  In the 
                                                 
30  See JULIA LOVELL, THE OPIUM WAR:  DRUGS, DREAMS AND THE MAKING OF CHINA 
(2012). 
31 See Ford, supra note 1, at 149-53, 168-70; John K. Fairbank, The creation of the treaty 
system, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA VOLUME TEN: LATE CH’ING 1800-1911, PART 1, 
at 213 (John K. Fairbank ed., 1978).   
32 See PAUL A. COHEN, HISTORY IN THREE KEYS:  THE BOXERS AS EVENT, EXPERIENCE, AND 
MYTH (1998).   
33 See Lovell, supra note 30, at 9 (“In China today, the Opium War is the traumatic 
inauguration of the country’s modern history.  History books, television documentaries and 
museums chorus a received wisdom about the conflict.”).  Lovell questions that “received 
wisdom” and argues that the Chinese government has been fabricating it. 
34 In the nineteenth century, more powerful Western nations, including the United States, 
succeeded in imposing “unequal treaties” on (then) weaker non-Western states such as 
Japan, China, and the Ottoman Empire.  See, e.g., Denunciation of the Treaty of November 
2nd, 1865, between China and Belgium, PCIJ, SER. A 8 (1925) (describing rights of 
Belgians in China under treaty); MICHAEL R. AUSLIN, NEGOTIATING WITH IMPERIALISM: 
THE UNEQUAL TREATIES AND THE CULTURE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY (2004) (studying 
diplomacy of unequal treaties with Japan); Ingrid Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties, 
11 I.C.L.Q. 1069, 1073–75, 1078–80 (1962) (surveying unequal treaties between Western 
powers and China); Ford, supra note 1, at 121-156 (narrating evolution of unequal treaty 
system); Gustavo Gozzi, The Particularistic Universalism of International Law in the 
Nineteenth Century, 52 HARV. J. INT’L L. 73, 79-80 (2010) (discussing China), available at 
http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/HILJ-Online_52_Gozzi.pdf; 
Christian Tomuschat, Asia and International Law – Common Ground and Regional 
Diversity, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 217, 222 (2011) (discussing China); Report of Edward A. 
Van Dyck, Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire Since the Year 1150 (G.P.O. 1881) (study 
both of “capitulations” in Ottoman Empire and of Ottoman Empire’s place in public 
international law).  Typically under such “unequal treaties,” Western nationals residing in 
those countries and accused of crimes under local law were to be tried, not in the courts of 
the local sovereign, but in their own sovereign’s “consular courts” within those territories. 
One common justification offered for this manifestly unequal practice (which, of course, 
derogated from the territorial sovereignty of the weaker power) was that they were 
“essential to the peaceful residence of [Western] Christians within those countries and the 
successful prosecution of commerce with their people.” In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 
(1891).  The unequal treaty system did not merely reflect the Western perception that 
China’s judicial system was insufficiently developed.  Rather, it derived from the more 
fundamental belief that China, unlike the Western states, was not truly “civilized,” and 
hence was not entitled to equal recognition under international law.  See Brett Bowden, 
The Colonial Origins of International Law, European Expansion and the Classical 
Standard of Civilization, 7 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1, 20 (2005).  Western legal scholars and other 
public intellectuals commonly affirmed the opinion either that China was not “civilized” or 
that its civilization had become “arrested.” See EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL 
SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS, 115 (2002); Beate Jahn, 
Barbarian thoughts: imperialism in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, 31 REV. INT’L STUD. 
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last century or so, China has witnessed the collapse of the imperial 
government and Qing dynasty (1911); the emergence of a 
republican form of government (1912); a phase of internecine war 
in which much of the country was dominated by local war lords 
(1920s);35 the beginning (or rather renewal) of Japanese aggression 
in 1931, with the annexation of Manchuria;36 a full-scale war with 
Japan from 1937 to 1945, in which much of China was subdued and 
occupied by Japanese forces, horrifying atrocities were committed 
by the invaders,37 and perhaps fifty million Chinese were killed;38 a 
civil war between Nationalists and Communists ending in 1949; a 
Communist victory; a severe famine during the Great Leap Forward 
(in which some 30-45 million people, mostly peasants, died);39 and a 
devastating Cultural Revolution. 40   The Oxford historian Rana 
Mitter, commenting on the period between the late 1930s and the 
                                                                                                               
599, 602-03 (2005).  For contemporary Chinese attitudes to the “unequal treaties” and 
those treaties’ relationship to Chinese nationalism, see PETER HAYS GRIES, CHINA’S NEW 
NATIONALISM: PRIDE, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY 47 (2004). See also DONG WANG, 
CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES:  NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (2005).   
35 See ADAM TOOZE, THE DELUGE: THE GREAT WAR AND THE REMAKING OF THE GLOBAL 
ORDER, 1916-1931 at 477-84 (2014).    
36 Japan had previously waged a successful war against China in 1894-5 that ended with 
the Shimonoseki Treaty, under which Japan acquired Taiwan, and Korea (which Japan 
acquired soon after) became independent of China.   
37 See Timothy Brook, The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking, 60 J. ASIAN STUD. 
673 (2001).  The incident known as the “Rape of Nanking” remains vivid in the minds of 
contemporary Chinese and Japanese alike, and controversy over the affair remains alive in 
both countries.  See Da Qing Yang, Convergence or Divergence?  Recent Historical 
Writings on the Rape of Nanjing, 3 AMER. HIST REV. 842 (1999).   
38 In the war with Japan, “China lost at least two million men in battle, and twelve million 
Chinese civilians died as a direct result of warfare.  Others died from starvation, 
destruction of dams and dikes, and disease and mistreatment in the Chinese army.” ODD 
ARNE WESTAD, RESTLESS EMPIRE:  CHINA AND THE WORLD SINCE 1750, at 249 (2012).  
Rana Mitter estimates that China’s war with Japan “saw around 20 million military and 
civilian Chinese deaths.” RANA MITTER, A BITTER REVOLUTION:  CHINA’S STRUGGLE WITH 
THE MODERN WORLD, at 156 (2004).  The severity of China’s losses helps explain its 
persisting antagonism towards Japan.   
39  See FRANK DITKÖTTER, MAO’S GREAT FAMINE:  THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S MOST 
DEVASTATING CATASTROPHE, 1958-1962 (2011); MITTER, supra note 38, at 156.   
40  See RODERICK MACFARQUHAR & MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, MAO’S LAST REVOLUTION 
(2006); MITTER, supra note 38, at 200-43.  Some scholars have argued, however, that 
China’s Cultural Revolution made possible the extraordinary transformation that occurred 
later under Deng Xiaoping. See Lucien W. Pye, Reassessing the Cultural Revolution, 108 
CHINA Q. 597, 610 (1986) (“If China had not been scarred by the violent turmoil of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the most likely alternative to Mao's revolutionary utopianism 
would have been little more than the dreary prospect of an orderly, bureaucratic form of 
communism. It seems unthinkable that China would or could have adopted the bold 
modernizing policies of the post-Mao era if the society had not experienced the shock of 
the Cultural Revolution.”). 
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early 1970s, writes that “these decades are inexorably marked by 
constant, endless, numbing death.” 41   By any reckoning, tens of 
millions, of Chinese have died from violence or starvation over the 
past century.  Given that recent history, China’s rise since 1978 can 
only be described as spectacular. 
To what is this remarkable progress owed?  Expert opinions 
differ, but several critical factors can be identified.42  First, it is owed 
to the extraordinary qualities of intelligence, foresight and 
statesmanship that China’s leadership has shown since 1978, and to 
the amazing resilience, energy and entrepreneurship of the Chinese 
people. 43  Second, a combination of domestic factors worked 
strongly in favor of China’s rapid development.  These factors 
included high investment and savings rates; 44 a tax structure that 
emphasizes value-added taxation over income taxes; 45  an 
inexhaustible reserve of (generally young) labor;46 the absence of 
                                                 
41 MITTER, supra note 38, at 156.   
42 A full-length study of the question is provided in RONALD COASE & NING WANG, HOW 
CHINA BECAME CAPITALIST (2012).  See also WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE:  HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 2-8 (2015), available at https://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf (“Economists generally attribute much of China’s rapid 
economic growth to two main factors: large-scale capital investment (financed by large 
domestic savings and foreign investment) and rapid productivity growth[…] Economic 
reforms led to higher efficiency in the economy, which boosted output and increased 
resources for additional investment in the economy.”).  
43 Coase and Wang point to the crucial role of “the disadvantaged and marginalized” in 
spurring China’s growth, especially in the agricultural sector. COASE & WANG, supra note 
41, at 46-53. “In China, it was the peasants, the unemployed urban residents, and other 
marginalized actors in the socialist economy that turned out to be the vanguard of market 
transformation.”  Id. at 67.  For the argument that the social structure of China’s “grass 
roots” have contributed to its rapid economic growth, see Martyn King White, The Social 
Roots of China’s Economic Development, 144 CHINA Q. 999 (1995); see also YuKong 
Zhao, What Drives China’s Success?, FORBES, Oct. 2, 2014, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/10/02/what-drives-chinas-success/.  
44  Michael Pettis, a professor of finance and economics at Peking University, lays 
particular emphasis on China’s unprecedentedly high household savings rate, together with 
its high levels of government and corporate saving and of domestic investment, and its 
correspondingly low levels of domestic income and consumption, as causes of what he 
argues is China’s “unbalanced” growth.  “The[]growth strategies engineered by Beijing 
forced households to subsidize investment and production, thus generating rapid economic 
and employment growth at the expense of household income growth.”  MICHAEL PETTIS, 
THE GREAT UNBALANCING: TRADE, CONFLICT, AND THE PERILOUS ROAD AHEAD FOR THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 79 (2013). 
45  Roger H. Gordon and Wei Li, Taxation and Economic Growth in China (2002), 
http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~rogordon/hongkng4.pdf 
46 Note, however, that China’s growth has been heavily capital intensive rather than labor 
intensive, owing to the extremely low cost of capital.  PETTIS, supra note 44, at 87. Id. 
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labor and environmental regulations;47 redundancies in employment 
in the state sector; incentives for officials to promote growth; cheap 
loans for exporters; a competitive currency; and overall social and 
political stability.  Third, early in the reform period, the central 
government introduced the system of so-called township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) which, despite operating on principles of public 
finance radically different from those used by public sector bodies 
in the West, essentially transformed local governments into profit-
making enterprises, thus stimulating important new investment. 48  
Fourth, the Chinese government also created conditions that 
encouraged foreign business and investment (especially after 
1992);49 it shifted entrepreneurial talent from the state bureaucracy 
to private business and slowly began recognizing private property 
rights.50  Fifth, especially since the 1990s, the private sector of the 
Chinese economy has arguably contributed even more to the 
nation’s growth rate than the sector controlled or subsidized by the 
government. 51   Finally, China’s growth was owed to the very 
hospitable international environment for trade and investment that 
was created and sustained by United States hegemony in the post-
                                                 
47  China has, of course, paid a shocking price for disregarding the degradation of its 
environment.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 39-90 (2d ed. 2010).  A deadly 
explosion in mid-August 2015 of hazardous chemicals stored in a warehouse near a 
residential district of Tianjin, China—a port city located in a “showcase” economic 
development zone not far from Beijing—stunned Chinese public opinion and provoked 
widespread questioning about the government’s environmental policies.  The calamity, 
which claimed over 150 lives, injured more than 700, and left millions more wondering 
about the effects of toxic fallout, led many outraged Chinese to wonder whether the effects 
of rapid economic expansion on public safety and environmental quality had become 
unacceptable.  Aggravating the concerns was the fact that a 2013 environmental impact 
study by the Tianjin Academy of Environmental Sciences had not mentioned that the 
proximity of the hazardous chemicals to residences and transport hubs was in violation of 
governmental regulations. See Andrew Jacobs, Javier C. Hernández & Chris Buckley, 
Behind Deadly Tianjin Blast, Shortcuts and Lax Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2015, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/31/world/asia/behind-tianjin-tragedy-a-
company-that-flouted-regulations-and-reaped-profits.html.   
48 See COASE & WANG, supra note 41, at 53-56; FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER 
AND POLITICAL DECAY:  FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
DEMOCRACY 377 (2014) (describing the workings of the TVEs and stressing their role at 
the outset of China’s growth spurt). 
49 See Id. at 59-64 (showing that early in the reform, the creation of Special Economic 
Zones, such as that in Shenzhen, were pivotal in opening China to the global economy).  
50 BEARDSON, supra note 1, at 54-55, 247-48 (illustrating the significant overlap between 
Party membership and the class of business entrepreneurs). 
51 NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESS IN CHINA 
(2014).   
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Second World War period, especially to the openness of markets in 
the developed world, above all that of the United States, to Chinese 
exports,52and to the flow of direct foreign investment into China,53 
which was accompanied by positive spillover effects.54  China has 
skillfully pursued the opportunities offered to it by the open global 
economy to drive its economic growth.  It is only in recent years 
that China has begun to press the development of its domestic 
consumer market.55   
 
China Viewed as a Threat 
Until very recently, and perhaps even now, United States 
elites have regarded China’s growth benignly.56  Chinese exports to 
the United States have greatly benefited United States consumers, 
and Chinese loans have financed both our government and private 
business projects.  China is also a major market for United States 
exporters, and an important destination for United States capital 
investment.  For much of the post-1978 period, moreover, United 
States policymakers have thought that China’s economic growth 
would also promote political changes, leading eventually to the 
demise of Communist Party of China (CPC) power and the 
                                                 
52 WESTAD, supra note 37, at 378, 384-85.  
53 See Holslag, supra note 5, at 56 (“In 1978, foreign direct investments in China were 
almost negligible, but they reached US$3 billion in 1989 and from then onwards continued 
to grow spectacularly.”). 
54 COASE & WANG, supra note 41, at 149-51. 
55 See Jeffrey Fung, China’s Shift to a Consumption-Driven Economy, CORNELL CURRENT 
(Nov. 12. 2014), available at http://www.cornellcurrent.com/2014/11/12/chinas-shift-to-a-
consumption-driven-economy/; Mark Purdy, China’s Economy, in Six Charts, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Nov. 29, 2013), available at https://hbr.org/2013/11/chinas-economy-in-six-charts. 
56 There are, of course, many signs that élite opinion is changing.  Consider an op-ed by a 
former contender for the Democratic Party presidential nomination. Wesley Clark, Opinion, 
Getting Real about China: To Manage China, Fix America First, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/sunday/getting-real-
about-china.html?partner=rss&emc=rss.  See also Fareed Zakaria, Opinion, China’s 
Growing Clout, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-chinas-growing-
clout/2014/11/13/fe0481f6-6b74-11e4-a31c-77759fc1eacc_story.html (“[I]f China uses its 
growing clout to keep asking countries to choose between the existing arrangements or 
new ones, it might create conditions for a new kind of Cold War in Asia. It will certainly 
help to undermine and destroy the current international order, which has been a platform 
on which peace and prosperity have flourished in Asia for seven decades.”); Andrew 
Browne, Can China Be Contained?, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2015), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534 (“U.S. foreign policy has 
reached a turning point, as analysts from across the political spectrum have started to dust 
off Cold War-era arguments and to speak of the need for a policy of containment against 
China.”).   
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emergence of a more democratic form of government.  This belief 
was underpinned by the assumption that a rising, prospering middle 
class would demand a greater political role and voice in China’s 
affairs.57  While campaigning for the United States Presidency in 
1999, candidate George W. Bush declared that “[e]conomic 
freedom creates habits of liberty.  And habits of liberty create 
expectations of democracy  . . . Trade freely with China, and time is 
on our side.”58  And some American analysts continue to affirm this 
belief.59   
                                                 
57 See STEFAN HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL 
WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 67 (2010).  
58 FRIEDBERG, supra note 1, at 16. 
59 See RICHARD ROSECRANCE, THE RESURGENCE OF THE WEST:  HOW A TRANSATLANTIC 
UNION CAN PREVENT WAR AND RESTORE THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 33 (2013) 
(asserting that about 30% of China’s population will be middle class by 2015 and that 
China would “normally” be democratizing).  But see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF 
POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PREHUMAN TIMES TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 474-75, 481 
(2011) (leaving open the question of whether China will follow path to democratization).  
Some would argue that China’s traditional political culture is inherently inhospitable to 
democratic government.  Lucian Pye has argued that a robust civil society, whose 
challenges to the State furthered the rise of democracy in the West, has traditionally not 
existed in China. Lucian Pye, Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful 
Concepts for Explaining Asia, 29 J. OF INTERDISC. HIST. 763 (1999).  The tripartite division 
of Chinese life into the State, the public sphere  (of mutual obligations based on kinship, 
clan, village, guild or other ties) and the private sphere, inhibited the development of 
powerful, autonomous, informal interests groups that could contest the claims of the State, 
bargain with it, or impose their will on it.  Id. at 777-80.  Pye did not claim that China 
would not make the transition to democracy; indeed, he maintained that it could.  Id. at 780.  
But if it did so, then the transition would take a markedly different course from that in the 
West.  Id. at 782.  In a subtle analysis, Rana Mitter suggests that pluralism and liberalism, 
both of which are considered crucial elements of democracy in the West, have not had 
influential supporters in China, even among those who advocate “democracy” there. He 
attributes this in large part to the sense of national “crisis” that has haunted Chinese 
intellectuals for decades. MITTER, supra note 38, at 281-83.  Mitter also argues, however, 
that the example of the vigorous democracy of Taiwan, which while smaller than the 
mainland is undoubtedly “Chinese,” demonstrates that there is no intrinsic incompatibility 
between Chinese culture and democracy.  Id. at 305-08.  Finally, we should also reject the 
notion that Chinese society is somehow incapable of grasping the concept of human rights. 
To be sure, traditional Confucian emphases on the linkages between duties and specific 
social roles, on hierarchy and on non-adversity may militate against full acceptance of 
human rights régimes.  See Justin Tiwald, Confucianism and Human Rights, in HANDBOOK 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 244 (Thomas Cushman ed., 2012); Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, 
Dragons, and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of 
Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1107-12 (1996); Jack Donnelly, Human 
Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human 
Rights, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 303, 308-09 (1982).  But, as scholars have argued, the 
demand for human rights has been powerful in China.  See MARINA SVENSSON, DEBATING 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: A CONCEPTUAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 51-58, 200-06, 311-12 
(2002).  Peng-chun Chang, a leading Chinese philosopher and diplomat, played a leading 
role in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).  HANS JOAS, THE 
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 Increasingly, however, China strikes many in the American 
policy-making community and public as a growing threat—a kind 
of fusion of the economic dynamism of Japan of the 1980s with the 
military power of the Soviet Union of the 1950s.  And the strategic 
mistrust is felt on both sides:  interviews with Chinese leaders in 
2012 revealed that many of them regard the United States as 
China’s main national security threat. 60   In its May 2015 White 
Paper on China’s military strategy, the Chinese Ministry of National 
Defense stated that while “[i]n the foreseeable future, a world war is 
unlikely,” nonetheless there are “new threats from hegemonism, 
power politics and neo-interventionism.”61  The risks of a military 
confrontation between the United States and China are surely not 
negligible in the case of Taiwan,62 and the United States Defense 
Department has recently outlined a maritime security strategy that 
reflects American military planners’ growing concerns over China’s 
land reclamation projects and other activities in the South China 
Sea.63  Improbable as it still seems, therefore, a future war between 
                                                                                                               
SACREDNESS OF THE PERSON: A NEW GENEALOGY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 186-87 (Alex Skinner 
trans., 2013).   
60 Chinese leaders “believe that the ultimate goal of the U.S…. is to maintain its global 
hegemony [and so] conclude that America will seek to constrain or even upset China’s rise.”  
Kenneth Leiberthal & Wang Jisi, Assessing U.S.-China Strategic Mistrust, in CHINA 
CENTER MONOGRAPHS, at viii, (John L. Thornton China Ctr. Monograph Ser. No. 4, 2012), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/30% 
20us%20china%20lieberthal/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf.  See also id. at 10-11, 13.  
Likewise, a study published in 2013 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
found that “[i]n both the United States and China, elites and the general public expressed 
low levels of trust in the other country.”  Symposium, U.S.-China Security Perceptions 
Survey: Findings and Implications, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 9 
(2013), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/us_china_security_ 
perceptions_report.pdf. See also Holslag, supra note 5, at 148. 
61  CHINESE MINISTRY OF NAT’L DEF., DOCUMENT: CHINA’S MILITARY STRATEGY (May 
2015), available at http://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy.   
62 See Charles Glaser, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military 
Competition and Accommodation, 39 INT’L SEC. 49, 69 (2015) [hereafter Glaser, U.S.-
China Grand Bargain]; see also AARON L. FRIEDBERG, BEYOND AIR-SEA BATTLE: THE 
DEBATE OVER U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN ASIA 18-19, 49-50 (2014) [hereafter FRIEDBERG, 
BEYOND AIR-SEA BATTLE]; RICHARD C. BUSH, UNCHARTED STRAIT: THE FUTURE OF CHINA-
TAIWAN RELATIONS 213 (2013); M. Taylor Fravel, Power Shifts and Escalation Explaining 
China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes, 32 Int’l Sec. 44, 81-82 (2007) (identifying 
dispute with Japan over Senkaku Islands and with United States over Taiwan as the “[o]nly 
two disputes involving China [that] might threaten major conflict and instability in the 
region”). 
63  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY: 
ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 15-17 
(2015), available at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-
P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.  See also 
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the United States and China, perhaps even within the coming decade, 
cannot be ruled out. 64   Indeed, both the United States and the 
Chinese militaries “are arming for an all-out war and pursuing 
enormously expensive master strategies that assume that such a war 
will occur.”65  A senior United States Navy intelligence officer with 
the Pacific Fleet affirmed in 2014 that the Chinese Navy is 
preparing for a “short, sharp war” with a vital United States ally, 
                                                                                                               
Editorial Board, China should tread carefully in the South China Sea, WASH. POST (Aug. 
25, 2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/china-should-tread-
carefully-in-the-south-china-sea/2015/08/25/f0c2b5b6-4a95-11e5-846d-
02792f854297_story.html.   
64 See, e.g., Coker, Improbable War, supra note 12, at 181 (“war [between the United 
States and China] is not inevitable, but nor is it as improbable as many experts suggest”); 
see also DALE C. COPELAND, ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND WAR 436-44 (2015) (war 
unlikely unless one side believes that the other seeks to deny its possibilities of expanded 
trade); Christensen, China Challenge, supra note 1, at 37-53 (arguing on both economic 
and military grounds against possibility of major war); NOAH FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE 
FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION 129-30, 162-63 (2013) (discussing risks of shooting war, 
including proxy wars, but also emphasizing likelihood of deepening cooperation); 
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE 
REST? 273-81 (2007) [hereinafter Peerenboom, China Modernizes]; Joachim Krause, 
Assessing the danger of war: parallels and differences between Europe in 1914 and East 
Asia in 2014, 90 INT’L AFF. 1421, 1423-24 (2014).  There is, of course, a substantial body 
of expert opinion to the effect that war, or at least war between two nuclear-armed Great 
Powers, is no longer a realistic possibility.  For recent contributions to this debate, see THE 
NEXT GREAT WAR? THE ROOTS OF WORLD WAR I AND THE RISK OF U.S.-CHINA CONFLICT 
(Richard N. Rosecranz & Steven D. Miller eds., 2015); CHRISTOPHER COKER, CAN WAR BE 
ELIMINATED? xii (2014); IAN MORRIS, WAR! WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR? CONFLICT AND THE 
PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION FROM PRIMATES TO ROBOTS (2014); RANDALL L. SCHWELLER, 
MAXWELL’S DEMON AND THE GOLDEN APPLES: GLOBAL DISCORD IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
(2014); JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WINNING THE WAR ON WAR: THE DECLINE OF ARMED 
CONFLICT WORLDWIDE (2012); STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: 
WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED (2011); JOHN MUELLER, THE REMNANTS OF WAR 2 (2004); 
Carl Kaysen, Review Is War Obsolete?: A Review Essay, 14 Int’l Sec. 42 (1990); WERNER 
LEVI, THE COMING END OF WAR (1981); Bruno Tertrais, The Demise of Ares: The End of 
War as We Know It?, 35 WASH. Q. 7 (2012) (useful summary of the case that inter-state 
war is on the way out).  The idea can be traced back to (among others) the German 
sociologist, Norbert Elias, though it can be found in the writings of some Enlightenment 
figures, such as the Scottish historian William Robertson. See NORBERT ELIAS, THE 
CIVILIZING PROCESS (English trans. ed. 1969 & 1982); see also William Robertson, A View 
of the Progress of Society in Europe, in 3 THE WORKS OF WILLIAM ROBERTSON 64 (1825) 
(effect of chivalry in limiting ferocity of war).  For a study of pre-1914 arguments for “the 
natural decline of warfare,” see DAVID PAUL CROOK, DARWINISM, WAR AND HISTORY 98-
129 (1994).     
65 Doug Saunders, Why are the U.S. and China preparing for war with one another?, 
GLOBE & MAIL (July 12, 2013), available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
debate/us-and-china-smile-for-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/.   
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Japan.66  Those who think that a major power war is impossible in 
contemporary circumstances would do well to recall statements 
such as those of the distinguished British historian G.P. Gooch, who 
wrote in 1912—just two years before the outbreak of the 
cataclysmic First World War—that “[w]e can now look forward 
with something like confidence to the time when war between 
civilized nations will be considered as antiquated as the duel.”67 
The benign assumptions about China commonly made in the 
past were based on the experience of the West, and do not seem to 
correspond to the situation in China or other parts of East Asia.68  
Middle class affluence need not translate into demands for 
democratization;69 indeed, a rising middle class may prefer a more 
autocratic form of government, if that government provides political 
stability, protects property and contract rights,70 promotes domestic 
wealth creation, attracts international respect, and controls the poor 
and working class.  Those conditions have been broadly met, so far, 
by the CPC.71  On the other hand, “[o]ver the past two decades or so, 
                                                 
66Perry Chiaramonte, China preps military for ‘short, sharp war’ with Japan, U.S. Navy 
analyst says, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 19, 2014), available at http://www.foxnews.com/ 
world/2014/02/19/china-preps-military-for-short-sharp-war-with-japan-says-us-navy/.  
67 Quoted in ARTHUR J. MAY, THE PASSING OF THE HAPSBURG MONARCHY 1914-1918 82 
(1966). 
68 HALPER, supra note 57, at 134. 
69 See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & George W. Downs, Development and Democracy, 84 
FOREIGN AFF. 77-78 (2005) (“[G]reater wealth alone does not automatically lead to greater 
political freedom . . . [T]here is now plenty of evidence to suggest that autocratic and 
illiberal governments . . . can delay democracy for a very long time”). 
70 China’s rapid economic growth has apparently been accomplished even in the absence of 
a robust “rule of law” protecting property and contract rights.  See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, 
CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 462-92, 496-98 (2002) (providing a careful 
analysis of the rapid economic growth without a robust “rule of law” protecting property 
and contract rights, as well as a cautious argument that the further entrenchment of rule of 
law and enforceable property rights will be necessary to sustain China’s growth).  See also 
Peerenboom, China Modernizes, supra note 61, at 35-40 (rule of law may not be necessary 
or significant in a poor, rural-based economy, where substitutes in private ordering are 
available; but it becomes more significant at higher levels of economic development); id. at 
75 (noting that property rights are enforceable in Chinese courts).  In any case, the 
problematic nature of the very question “Does China have the rule of law?” should be 
appreciated.  See Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 229-33 
(2002).  
71 Moreover, to say that the Chinese government is not “democratic” in the Western sense 
is emphatically not to say that it is unaware of, or unresponsive to, domestic public opinion.  
“[T]he authorities do monitor public opinion and use it in deciding policy.  They govern as 
if they were running for election but the elections never come.  There is an (unnegotiated) 
civil contract between the state and the individual: the state will seek to provide social 
stability and rising prosperity without unreasonable taxation or wealth redistribution; in 
return, the citizen should enter the political space only by invitation.  The contract has 
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high-income [Western] countries have actively promoted 
democracy across the low-income world, with the result that 
democracy increased political violence.”72 
 
Democracy vs. Meritocracy 
Indeed, for much of the world, it is democracy, not 
autocracy, that seems increasingly outdated.73 From this perspective, 
“actually existing democracy in the Western world no longer sets a 
clear-cut positive model for other countries.”74  Some would even 
argue that China’s “authoritarianism” or (better) “meritocracy,” 
with appropriate modifications, could provide a more attractive 
model for the future, including that of the West. 75   In general, 
political and legal institutions that have served the West well for 
centuries are widely seen to be failing. 76   The argument that 
governmental legitimacy depended on democratic institutions may 
have seemed persuasive in the immediate aftermath of the West’s 
Cold War victory;77 it does so no longer.  Chinese thinkers contend 
plausibly that their country’s “meritocratic” system of leadership 
selection78 is better at serving their public’s welfare than the United 
                                                                                                               
worked well for hundreds of millions of people.” BEARDSON, supra note 1, at 237; see also 
FELDMAN, supra note 61, at 91-92.   
72  DANIEL A. BELL, THE CHINA MODEL: POLITICAL MERITOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF 
DEMOCRACY 19 (2015). 
73 See JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 
AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (2014); HALPER, supra 
note 57, at 130-34 (declining support globally for Western-style democracy).  
74 BELL, supra note 72, at 3. 
75 See Id. at 179-80; HALPER, supra note 57.  See also CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, NO ONE’S 
WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, AND THE COMING GLOBAL TURN 93-105 (2012) 
(analysis of the strengths and vulnerabilities of China’s non-democratic form of 
government). 
76 See generally NIALL FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEGENERATION: HOW INSTITUTIONS DECAY 
AND ECONOMIES DIE (2013).  
77 See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 
46, 46 (1992).   
78  China employs different types of criteria for selecting leadership at the local, 
intermediate and national levels of government.  At the local level, the system tends to be 
more “democratic;” at the top level, it is purely “meritocratic;” the intermediate level is 
something of a hybrid.  The criteria for selection into and promotion within the highest 
reaches of the national leadership are rigorous.  China emphasizes “that public officials 
should have the managerial skills, professional knowledge, and broad understanding of 
China and the world necessary to lead the country to full modernity and global 
prominence.”  BELL, supra note 72, at 185.  China’s national leaders must have 
demonstrated their proficiency at governing in many capacities and over several decades: 
 
To get to the top, party officials must typically start from leadership at 
a primary-level office and then be promoted successively to the 
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States model of electoral democracy would be.79  Arguably, too, the 
prolonged and careful vetting that China’s leadership undergoes 
before rising to the very top provides a solution for what Francis 
Fukuyama calls China’s traditional “Bad Emperor” problem, i.e., 
the difficulty that authoritarian systems have in ensuring “a 
continuing supply of good leaders.”80  
 Zhang Weiwei, a leading Chinese international relations 
expert, argues that Western-style electoral democracy is both 
unsuitable to China and unlikely to evolve there.  This is a matter 
both of the permanent circumstances of China’s existence and of its 
deep-set political culture: 
 
In China’s long history, all governments are expected 
to show special concern for improving people’s 
                                                                                                               
township level, a county division, a department bureau, and the 
provincial ministry level.  A public official aiming to reach the position 
of vice-minister has to be promoted from senior member to deputy 
section chief, section chief, . . . deputy division chief, division chief, 
deputy bureau chief, bureau chief, and vice-minister.  If one meets the 
minimum length of service at each rank, one needs at least twenty 
years to reach the position of vice-minister . . .  The top candidates are 
sent for further training at party and administrative schools in China, 
and many promising officials are sent to top universities abroad to 
learn best administrative practices from around the world. Out of seven 
million leading cadres, only one out of 140,000 makes it to the 
province/ministry level.  A select few move up the ranks and make it to 
the party’s Central Committee and then the twenty-five member 
Politburo.  The members at the very apex of political power – the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo – must normally have served as 
governors of two provinces, each the size and population of most 
countries.  In short, top leaders must pass through a battery of merit-
based tests and accumulate decades of extensive and diverse 
administrative experience. 
 
Id. at 186-87.     
79 See Zhang Weiwei, Opinion, Meritocracy Versus Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/opinion/meritocracy-versus-
democracy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  While China’s meritocratic selection process for 
its governing élite traces back to the Confucian past, the current system was put in place by 
Deng Xioping. VOGEL, supra note 28, at 701-03.   
80 FUKUYAMA, supra note 46, at 383.  Fukuyama asserts that “[c]ontemporary China faces 
precisely this kind of problem,” but acknowledges that for “several decades” China has 
performed “extremely well” as compared to “many democratic regimes.”  Id.  It is unclear, 
specifically, why this should be considered a Chinese problem – or why China’s 
performance-driven selection methods are not as good an answer to it as any other.  Other 
scholars have indeed suggested that the current Chinese oligarchy may in fact provide the 
solution to the “bad emperor” problem.  See YURI PINES, THE EVERLASTING EMPIRE: THE 
POLITICAL CULTURE OF ANCIENT CHINA AND ITS IMPERIAL LEGACY 170 (2012). 
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livelihood, tackle natural and man-made disasters 
and cope with all the challenges posed by China’s 
huge population and vast territory . . .  Over the past 
millennia, the Chinese have shaped a political culture 
characterized by a longer-term vision and a more 
holistic way of perceiving politics.  Most Chinese 
tend to value highly their country’s overall stability 
and prosperity.  It is unimaginable that most Chinese 
would ever accept the so-called multi-party 
democratic system with a change of central 
government every four years, and furthermore, all 
prosperous dynasties in the Chinese history were all 
associated with a strong and enlightened State.  [The 
CPC] continues the long tradition of a unified 
Confucian ruling entity, which represents or tries to 
represent the interest of the whole society, rather than 
a Western-style political party which openly 
represents group interests . . .  The experience of 
China’s Republican Revolution of 1911 serves to 
illustrate the point. The Revolution copied the 
Western political model and the whole country 
immediately fell into chaos and disintegration, with 
warlords, each supported by one or a few foreign 
powers, fighting each other for their own interests.81   
 
Another leading Chinese theorist and intellectual, Yu 
Keping, has argued powerfully in favor of democracy for China.  
But on closer inspection, it appears that what is being defended is a 
type of democracy that is markedly different from the Western 
conception, and that is characterized as having specifically Chinese 
characteristics.  One might even describe it as a responsive form of 
authoritarianism: 
 
What does Chinese-style democracy exactly mean? 
The CCP proposes four types of democracy in China: 
democratic election, democratic decision-making, 
democratic management, and democratic supervision. 
But as far as democratic elections go, Chinese 
government seems to concentrate more on political 
                                                 
81 Zhang, supra note 1, at 60. 
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deliberation. Thus, some scholars consider the 
Chinese way of democracy as “deliberative 
democracy”. China insists on practicing the CCP’s 
dominant rule and not necessarily a multiparty 
system or parliamentary politics. However, Chinese 
polity is not simply a single party politics, but the 
political system of “multi-party cooperation and 
political consultation under the leadership of the 
CCP.” China also does not implement a complete 
“checks and balances” to separate legislative, 
executive, and judicial bodies, but there is a relative 
independence among legislation, administration, and 
judiciary branches, which are divided into three 
separate systems.82 
 
However, even if China were to become more democratic as 
the West understands it, that outcome would not necessarily serve 
China’s, American or the world’s interests well.83  Empirical studies 
tend to support the view that electoral democratization at lower 
levels of national wealth is unlikely to lead to economic 
development and may indeed hinder it.84  (“Premature” democracies 
such as India, Indonesia or the Philippines serve to illustrate this 
thesis.)  Moreover, a more democratic China might well prove to be 
a more nationalistic, bellicose one.85  The Arab Spring may have 
                                                 
82 Yu Keping, Democracy in China: Challenge or Opportunity?, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., at 
8 available at http://www.ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/democracyinchina.pdf.  See 
also Yu Keping, How to Achieve Orderly Democracy, SINOCISM CHINA NEWSL. (July 14, 
2013), available at https://sinocism.com/?p=9749.   
83 Even those experts who forecast a coming “crackup” of Communist Party rule in China 
believe that it would be “highly unstable and unsettled.” See David Shambaugh, The 
Coming Chinese Crackup, WALL ST. J. (March 6, 2015), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198.  For a critique of 
Shambaugh’s analysis, see Chen Dingding, Sorry, America: China is NOT Going to 
Collapse, NAT’L INT. (March 10, 2015), available at http://nationalinterest.org/ 
feature/sorry-america-china-not-going-collapse-12389. 
84 See PEERENBOOM, China Modernizes, supra note 61, at 63-5; 79-80; HALPER, supra note 
57, at 133-34.  On the contingency of the linkages among democracy, human rights, and 
economic development, see Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Democracy and Development, 
21 HUM. RTS. Q. 608 (1999).    
85 See Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, 
and War, 56 INT’L ORG. 297, 298 (2002) (“We find that the heightened danger of war 
grows primarily out of the transition from an autocratic regime to one that is partly 
democratic. The specter of war during this phase of democratization looms especially large 
when governmental institutions, including those regulating political participation, are 
especially weak. Under these conditions, elites commonly employ nationalist rhetoric to 
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brought down some longstanding dictatorships in the Middle East 
and threatened others; but the Arab world has not been made less 
violent or war-prone as a result.  On the other hand, so long as the 
vast differences between China’s political ideology and system of 
government and those of the United States exist, they will tend to 
deepen suspicion between the two nations and heighten the risk of 
armed conflict.86  
Moreover, the Chinese government’s longstanding 
resistance to the more exorbitant claims made by proponents of 
human rights doctrine is not wholly self-serving. 87   Chinese 
strategists believe that the promotion of international human rights 
is an important ingredient in an overall United States strategy to 
insure global American hegemony.88 Furthermore, China may well 
be justified in arguing that liberal Western democracies’ evaluations 
of its human rights record are biased, and hold it to a higher 
standard than other non-democracies, or even than comparable 
democracies like India.89  In fairness, China’s performance may be 
better measured by a “contender model,” which would evaluate it in 
a comparative context against those nations most like it, rather than 
                                                                                                               
mobilize mass support but then become drawn into the belligerent foreign policies 
unleashed by this process. We find, in contrast, that transitions that quickly culminate in a 
fully coherent democracy are much less perilous.”). 
In a perceptive passage, the philosopher Adam Ferguson, one of the most prominent 
figures of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment, observed that nationalist feelings 
among the lower ranks of society can drive a state to war, despite the contrary judgments 
of its leading statesmen.   
 
[I]t is among [the peasants] that we find the materials of war and 
dissension laid without the direction of government, and sparks ready 
to kindle into a flame, which the statesman is frequently disposed to 
extinguish. The fire will not always catch where [the statesman’s] 
reasons of state would direct, nor stop where the concurrence of 
interest has produced an alliance. “My father,” said a Spanish peasant, 
“would rise from his grave, if he could foresee a war with France.” 
 
Adam Ferguson, Of the Principles of War and Dissension, in AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY, 37-38 (1757), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ferguson-an-
essay-on-the-history-of-civil-society?q=peasant#Ferguson_1229_47.  One can readily 
imagine a Chinese peasant expressing the same sentiment, in relation to a war with Japan.   
86 See MARK L. HAAS, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF GREAT POWER POLITICS, 1789-1989 
(2005) (ideological differences between States tend to cause heightened threat perceptions 
and consequently affect their foreign policies).   
87  For a helpful summary of the main features of China’s human rights outlook, see 
PEERENBOOM, China Modernizes, supra note 61, at 85-90. 
88  See Yong Deng, Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global 
Strategy, 116 POLI. SCI. Q. 343, 351-52 (2001). 
89 See PEERENBOOM, China Modernizes, supra note 61, at 169-74. 
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by the “offender model” commonly applied by Western 
governments and human rights activists (which holds China to an 
absolute standard).90  Moreover, harsh criticism of China’s human 
rights record, especially if it seems to be applying a double standard, 
may be self-defeating and work to promote feelings of nationalism 
and resentment.91  China’s emphasis on promoting the welfare of its 
population through economic growth rather than on improving its 
human rights performance is arguably a defensible choice for a 
developing State.92  Although China’s emphasis on “social stability” 
often leads to human rights abuses, nonetheless the country’s 
leadership believes that such stability “is what enabled China to lift 
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in a mere few decades, 
generate huge economic growth, and peacefully re-establish China 
as a major power.”93  Moreover, China’s people seem to endorse the 
views of their leadership on these matters:  “[t]here is little doubt 
that the large majority of Chinese consider the current political 
system to be the appropriate system for their country.” 94   The 
Chinese Communist Party appears, thus far, to have been successful 
in drawing legitimacy from traditional Chinese norms of good 




II. Balancing and “Containment” 
 
                                                 
90 See Yang Wang, China Reexamined:  The Worst Offender or a Strong Contender?, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 1143, 1148-52 (2008). 
91 Id. at 165. 
92 See Eric Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1762 & 
n.15, 1771-72 (2008).   
93  Paul Gewirtz, What China Means by ‘Rule of Law,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2014), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/opinion/what-china-means-by-rule-of-
law.html?_r=0.  
94 BELL, supra note, 72 at 137.  Bell also points to a survey showing that China’s people 
evince a higher level of trust in their political institutions than do the populations of eight 
other Asian societies, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  Id. 
95 See HALPER, supra note 57, at 150 (“The CCP has learned to draw legitimacy and 
strength from the underlying Confucian roots of Chinese culture.  Confucian precepts are 
based on a role-based system of ethics, in which the governed and the governors respect 
and protect each other’s place, so long as each side fulfills its side of the bargain.  Thus is 
the Confucian utopia for a harmonious society.  The ruled are subservient to the ruler, but 
only because the ruler fulfills the important duties of ensuring livelihood, shelter, education, 
and security from foreign invasion.  If the ruler fails in these regards, then Chinese 
peasantry have a heritage for bottom-up rebellion that is almost unrivaled in history.”). 
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As discussed above, China’s rise has caused anxiety both 
among its near neighbors and in the United States  Especially since 
the financial crisis of 2008 (the effects of which are still being felt in 
the West), some observers perceive China’s conduct as having 
become more aggressive, particularly with regard to the disputed 
islands in China’s coastal periphery, including the South and East 
China Seas.96  China claims ownership of more than 80% of the 
South China Sea—to the consternation of other coastal States in the 
area—and has backed up its claims with actions that have provoked 
confrontations with Vietnam and the Philippines.97  (The Philippines 
has initiated proceedings before the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)98 to resolve part of its disputes with China.99)  China is 
                                                 
96 For an in-depth study of China’s claims to these islands and its actions concerning them, 
see RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42784, MARITIME TERRITORIAL AND 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES INVOLVING CHINA:  ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 
(2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf.  Chinese military analysts have 
written since 2010 about the “new situation” in the international strategic environment 
created by the financial crisis of 2008.  In the most recent writing, references to a 
“harmonious world” have disappeared.  See David Bradley, A ‘New Situation’: China’s 
Evolving Assessment of its Security Environment, 14 China Brief 6 (2014), available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42690
&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=758&no_cache=1#.VDGkaP0o45s.    
97  See Howard W. French, China’s Dangerous Game, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2014, at 96, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/chinas-dangerous-
game/380789/. For legal analyses of the islands dispute in the South China Sea, see BILL 
HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ASIA 108-20 (2014); 
Jacques deLisle, Troubled Waters: China’s Claims and the South China Sea (2012), 56 
ORBIS 608, available at http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0030438712000658/1-s2.0-
S0030438712000658-main.pdf?_tid=1582dd86-3eb2-11e4-ad90-
00000aab0f01&acdnat=1410989711_1c7694beafbdab9b531d3f6a132f5c00; Masahiko 
Asada, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (updated 2007), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/ 
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e2015?rskey=WGpspE&result=3&prd=EPIL. The United States disagrees with China’s 
view of its legal rights with respect to the EEZ.  See O’ROURKE, supra note 93, at 3-7.     
98 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the UNCLOS), 1833 U.N.T.S 3 / 
[1994] A.T.S. 31 / 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (entered into force November 16, 1994), 
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.   
99  See Republic of the Phil. v. China, 2013-19, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7. The proceeding, which primarily concerns the 
Spratly Islands and the “maritime features” (islands, rocks, reefs) around them, began in 
January 2013, when the Philippines notified China of its claim under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to maritime jurisdiction in the South China 
Sea (or what the Notification referred to as “the West Philippine Sea”).  A month later, 
China responded with a diplomatic note to the Philippines, rejecting and returning the 
latter’s Notification.  Thereafter, China elaborated its views in a December 2014 “Position 
Paper.” See Republic of the Phil. v. China, 2013-19, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013), available at 
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7.  The Philippines asserted that it was not contesting 
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also engaged in a dispute with Japan over the uninhabited 
Senkaku/Daioyu Islands (which are located close to significant 
underwater oil and gas reserves 100 ).  Although signs of a more 
conciliatory approach on both sides have appeared,101 this dispute 
has also led to rising tensions and military incidents.102   
                                                                                                               
sovereignty over the disputed “maritime features” of the South China Sea (which would 
involve consideration of the parties’ “historic rights,” compare Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), 
Judgment, I.C.J. REPORTS 2008, p. 12), but was rather asking the PCA to determine the 
status of the relevant “maritime features” under the UNCLOS. 
 
Roughly, the UNCLOS’ rules determine how different types of maritime features support 
different types of claims to territorial waters and “exclusive economic zones” (EEZ).  Thus, 
a rock above water generates a claim to the twelve-mile territorial sea around it, but 
nothing more; a reef submerged at high tide generates no claims; and a habitable “island” 
generates claims both to the surrounding territorial sea and to an EEZ for up to 200 
nautical miles out. 
 
In a unanimous decision of October 29, 2015, the PCA ruled that it had jurisdiction to 
consider several of the Philippines’ claims, and reserved decisions with respect to other 
claims for consideration together with the merits.  See Philippines v. China, PCA Case No. 
2013-19 (Oct. 29, 2015), available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506.  
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs thereupon released a statement saying that China 
would disregard any findings by the PCA in the merits phase of the case, and declaring that 
the PCA’s decision was “null and void, and has no binding effect on China.  See Do Viet 
Cuong, Don’t Believe China’s South China Sea Case Statement, in The Diplomat (Nov. 3, 
2015), available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/dont-believe-chinas-statement-on-the-
south-china-sea-case/. 
 
100  See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., East China Sea (2014), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/east_china_sea/east_china_sea.pdf.  By 
contrast, some experts believe that the areas of the South China Sea in dispute between 
China and its neighbors “actually contain relatively little oil and gas.”  HAYTON, supra note 
94, at 147.  However, the Department of Defense reports that “[t]hough figures vary 
substantially, the Energy Information Administration estimates that there are 
approximately 11 billion barrels and 190 trillion cubic feet of proved and probable oil and 
natural gas reserves in the South China Sea.”  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY: ACHIEVING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN A 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 5 (2015), available at http://www.defense.gov/ 
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-
FINALFORMAT.PDF.     
101  See Shannon Tiezzi, A China-Japan Breakthrough: A Primer on their Four-Point 
Consensus, DIPLOMAT, Nov. 7, 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-china-
japan-breakthrough-a-primer-on-their-4-point-consensus/ (before a meeting between 
Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese President Xi, the two nations issued somewhat 
differing diplomatic notes that referred, among other things, to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  
The Japanese text avoids mentioning that China makes claim to the islands, but 
acknowledges that “different views” exist as to how the dispute arose.).   
102  See JAMES MANICOM, BRIDGING TROUBLED WATERS: CHINA, JAPAN, AND MARITIME 
ORDER IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 190-208 (2014); Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International 
Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands, 29 J. INT'L L. 903 (2008). 
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Commentators such as the Indian strategic analyst Brahma 
Chellaney, surmise that under President Xi Jinping, China’s 
People’s Liberation Army has gained ascendancy over the civilian 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and is driving China, 
which he sees as increasingly “a praetorian State,” towards more 
confrontational policies with its neighbors.103  Certainly since Xi’s 
accession to the presidency in 2010, China’s leadership seems to 
some observers to have become more authoritarian in domestic 
policy and more challenging overseas. 104  Xi has reportedly 
“rehabilitated a group of ultra-hawkish generals and military 
advisers, some of whom were outspoken in their belief in an 
‘inevitable’ showdown with the United States.”105  Public statements 
by high-ranking Chinese officials have added to anxieties about its 
intentions: for example, in an important speech, General Wang 
Guanzhong unveiled China’s “New Security Concept for Asia,” that 
“appears to be an effort to redefine the idea of security on terms that 
cast China as a regional security provider and the United States as 
an over-assertive outsider that threatens to undermine regional 
security.”106   
Whatever China’s intentions may be, the undoubted growth 
of China’s military power is creating a situation in which other 
nations seem to be moving towards a “balance of power” against it.  
Thus, the distinguished American strategist Edward Luttwak has 
argued in The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy (2012) that 
China’s military expansion is calling into an existence a 
countervailing coalition of Asian States, who fear that China may 
undermine their independence.  For Luttwak, China faces a trade-off 
                                                 
103  Brahma Chellaney, Defensive India Needs to Take Firmer Stand Against China, 
HINDUSTAN TIMES, Sept. 18, 2014, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/ 
StoryPage/Print/1265782.aspx.  For some incidents illustrating China’s new-found 
assertiveness, see COKER, Improbable War, supra note 12, at 135.   
104 See Robert Marquand, Xi Jinping emerges as forceful No. 1 – rewriting China’s power 
playbook, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2014), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
World/Asia-Pacific/2014/1008/Xi-Jinping-emerges-as-forceful-No.-1-rewriting-China-s-
power-playbook.  But see Alastair Iain Johnston, How New and Assertive is China’s New 
Assertiveness?, 37 INT’L SEC. 7 (2013) (criticizing “new assertiveness” argument). 
105 COKER, Improbable War, supra note 12, at 135. 
106David Cohen, ‘A Clash of Security Concepts’: China’s Effort to Redefine Security, 14 
CHINA BRIEF 1(2014), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ 
chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42465&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=758&
no_cache=1#.VDGoWf0o45s.  China’s navy seems already to be in a position to contest 
United States dominance at sea.  See James R. Holmes, China’s Navy is already 
challenging the U.S. in Asia, DIPLOMAT, Oct. 16, 2014, available at 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/chinas-navy-is-already-challenging-the-us-in-asia/.   
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between growing economic prosperity and increasing military 
strength.  Should it pursue the latter, it will find itself checked by 
the economic and military counter-measures of its neighbors.  For 
Luttwak, the economically robust, militarily weak European Union 
would seem to be the proper model for China.   
There might, in fact, be substantial benefits to China if it 
followed this approach.
107
  China has few natural resources of its 
own, and is therefore heavily dependent on international trade. But 
most of China’s sources of raw materials are located at great 
distances from it.  About half of China’s oil imports come to it from 
the Middle East, some 6000 miles away.
108
  Iron from Australia or 
Brazil also travels thousands of miles.  True, China’s trading partner 
and near neighbor Russia can and does meet some of these needs.
109
 
And China is taking ruthless advantage of Russia’s current 
economic problems.
110
  But China may not want to become over-
dependent on Russia, with which it has had a troubled history, and 
which could again become an adversary.
111
  China could build naval 
forces and establish military bases closer to its suppliers in order to 
guarantee the flow of raw materials, but it would be cheaper for 
China to free-ride on the protection of international sea lanes and 
commercial traffic that the United States Navy provides as a global 
public good.  Furthermore, if China began an ambitious naval 
armaments program, it would stimulate countermeasures from the 
United States, Japan, and others. 
Moreover, China depends on access to Western and 
Japanese markets for its security and prosperity.  In the current 
global production chain, China provides the place of final the 
                                                 
107 See Yuen Foong Khong, Primacy or World Order? The United States and China’s Rise 
– A Review Essay, 38 INT’L SEC. 153, 172 (2013/4) (“China’s best shot at dislodging the 
United States is to continue growing at 6 to 8 percent annually for another quarter 
century.”); FELDMAN, supra note 61, at 23-25 (benefits to China of a gradual military 
build-up).    
108 DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL: THE PARTIAL POWER 163 (2013) (47% of 
China’s oil imports come from Middle East). 
109 See id. at 164. See also BEARDSON, supra note 1, at 315 (Kazakhstan also figures 
importantly in China’s energy import planning, as does Turkmenistan).  
110 Fred Weir, China cashes in on Russia’s shrinking economic options, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct. 14, 2014, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 
Europe/2014/1014/China-cashes-in-on-Russia-s-shrinking-economic-options-video.   
111 See SHAMBAUGH, supra note 105, at 7; BEARDSON, supra note 1, at 316. On the critical 
importance of the Malaccan Strait to the global economy, see Hans-Dieter Evers and 
Solvay Gerke, The Strategic Importance of the Straits of Malacca for World Trade and 
Regional Development, ZEF WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 17 (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020877.  
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assembly of goods sold to Western or Japanese consumers.  China 
receives import content in the form of high and medium tech goods, 
like small computers; adds low tech content; and then exports the 
finished product.  (Unlike Germany, another successful exporter, 
China does not contribute significant high tech content to the final 
product.  Thus, while Germany adds about sixty percent to the value 
added to the product, China adds about thirty percent.).  China is 
seeking both to expand its domestic market for its manufactures and 
to acquire greater high tech capability.  But it still depends on 
foreign markets.  Military conflict would jeopardize its access to 
them, disrupting China’s economy and threatening its domestic 
stability. 
Finally, anti-militarism has been an important strain in 
traditional Chinese thought and culture.  While it would be an 
exaggeration to claim that China’s wars were usually defensive and 
undertaken only as a last resort, all major schools of Chinese 
thought (with the exception of “Legalism”) tended to discourage the 
use of force.  Moreover, imperial China may have been deterred 
from military adventures by its longstanding strategic stalemate 
with northern nomads.
112
  To the extent that China bases its claims 
to regional and global leadership on the splendor of its civilization 
or on the attractiveness of the current “China model,”
113
 it may 





Control of the Seas 
Nonetheless, it seems most unlikely that China will be 
content to remain, like the European Union, an economic colossus 
but a military pygmy.
115
  Even apart from the desire for 
international standing, influence, and prestige, basic considerations 
of self-defense would impel Chinese militarization.  Simply 
consider China’s dependence on imported energy.  Almost 80% of 
                                                 
112 See Shaohua Hu, Chinese Pacifism, 32 ASIAN AFF. 256 (2006).  For a more critical 
perspective on traditional Chinese “pacifism,” see Don J. Wyatt, Confucian Ethical Action 
and the Boundaries of Peace and War, in BLACKWELL COMPANION TO RELIGION AND 
VIOLENCE (Andrew R. Murphy ed. 2011). 
113 See HALPER, supra note 57, at 32. 
114 See generally Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of 
a Stable Pacific 8-11 (2014). 
115 BLACKWILL & TELLIS, supra note 6, at 17 (“China does not see its interests served by 
becoming just another ‘trading state,’ no matter how constructive an outcome that might be 
for resolving the larger tensions between its economic and geopolitical strategies.”). 
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China’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Malacca between 
Malaysia and Singapore,
116
 creating what former Chinese President 
Hu Jintao called China’s “Malacca dilemma.”
117
  “In every respect 
can the Strait of Malacca be regarded as a life line of the rising 
dragon”
118
 (As if to dramatize the strategic importance of the Strait 
of Malacca, United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter made 
a well-publicized aerial transit over the area from a V-22 Osprey in 
May 2015).
119
  China surely does not want to permit the United 
States Navy to exercise unchallenged control over such a vital artery 
indefinitely.   
As Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan famously pointed out in 
his classic work The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–
1783,
120
 control over such maritime chokepoints is a matter of 
                                                 
116   Chen Shaofeng, China’s Self-Extrication from the “Malacca Dilemma” and 
Implications, 1 Int’l J. of China Stud. 1, 2 (2010). 
117 ZhongXiang Zhang, China’s Energy Security, the Malacca Dilemma and Responses, 39 
Energy Policy 7612, 7613 (2011) (explaining that “over the past few years top Chinese 
leaders have come to view the Strait of Malacca as a strategic vulnerability . . . In 
November 2003, the Chinese President Hu Jintan declared that ‘certain major powers’ 
were bent on controlling the strait, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate 
the perceived vulnerability.  Thereafter, the Chinese press devoted considerable attention to 
the country’s ‘Malacca dilemma.’”).  See also Charles L. Glaser, How Oil Influences U.S. 
National Security, 38 Int’l Sec. 112, 131-37 (2013) [hereinafter Glaser]; Chia Lin Sien, The 
Importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:  The Social and Marine Science 
Perspectives, 2 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 301, 303-04 (1998). See generally Marc 
Lanteigne, China’s Maritime Security and the “Malacca Dilemma,” 4 Asian Sec. 143 
(2008).  
118 Chen Shaofeng, supra note 116, at 2, 9 (“In the eyes of some Chinese strategic analysts, 
the Strait of Malacca is one of the strategic locations that the U.S. endeavours to command 
in that they are crucial for Washington to gain geopolitical preeminence, check the rise of 
China and other powers, and control the flow of world energy . . . China particularly 
worries that the U.S. might interdict seaborne oil flows into China in the event of military 
action against Taiwan . . . Such a concern seems reasonable.”).  
119  Council on Foreign Relations, Remarks by Defense Secretary Carter “A Regional 
Security Architecture Where Everybody Rises” (May 30, 2015), (transcript available at 
http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/remarks-defense-secretary-carter-regional-security-
architecture-everyone-rises/p36591)(“Yesterday, I took an aerial transit of the Strait of 
Malacca.  And when viewed from the air, it is even clearer how critical this region’s 
waterways are to international trade and energy resources.  We’ve all benefitted from free 
and open access to the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.  We all have a 
fundamental stake in the security of the South China Sea.  And that’s why we all have deep 
concerns about any party that attempts to undermine the states [sic] quo and generate 
instability there, whether by force, coercion, or simply by creating irreversible facts on the 
ground, in the air, or in the water.”). 
120 A.T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, 32 (12th ed. 
1890), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm  (noting 
the devastating strategic consequences for Spain that flowed from its loss of Gibraltar to 
Britain: “But for the loss of Gibraltar, the position of Spain would have been closely 
analogous to that of England.  Looking at once upon the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/2
2015]   TOWARDS A CONCERT OF ASIA                33 
 
extreme strategic sensitivity to states.  On occasion, disputes over 
their control have led to war.
121
  Thus, the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-05 was due, in part, to the imperative need that both Great 
Powers felt to dominate the Tsushima Strait;
122
 Imperial Russia may 
have entered, or even engineered, the First World War in order to 
seize the Dardanelles;
123
 Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality 
in 1914 precipitated Britain’s intervention in the war, owing in part 
to the need to prevent German control of critical ports near the 
English Channel;
124
 Imperial Germany constructed the Kiel Canal to 
balance against British naval superiority;
125
 Spain’s seizure in 1940 
of the internationalized zone of Tangier—which commanded the 
southwestern shore of the entrance to the Mediterranean and so 
encroached on Gibraltar—caused grave concern to Great Britain, 
                                                                                                               
with Cadiz on the one side and Cartagena on the other, the trade to the Levant must have 
passed under her hands, and that round the Cape of Good Hope not far from her doors. But 
Gibraltar not only deprived her of the control of the Straits, it also imposed an obstacle to 
the easy junction of the two divisions of her fleet.”). See generally James Holmes & TOSHI 
YOSHIHARA, CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  THE TURN TO MAHAN 
(2008) (noting that Mahan’s classic work informs China’s strategic thinking). 
121 See CHRISTOPHER M. BELL, THE ROYAL NAVY, SEAPOWER AND STRATEGY BETWEEN THE 
WARS 69-72 (2000) (noting that the region around the Malaccan Strait has figured in naval 
war planning in the past.  During the inter-war period, the British Royal Navy intended to 
use its naval base at Singapore to attack Japanese trade and transport routes if war in the 
Far East broke out.). See also John Ferris, ‘It Is Our Business in the Navy to Command the 
Seas’:  The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919-1929, in FAR-FLUNG LINES: 
STUDIES IN IMPERIAL DEFENCE IN HONOUR OF DONALD MACKENZIE SCHURMAN 124, 139-40 
(Greg Kennedy & Keith Neilson eds., 1997). 
122 Russia wished to be able to move its shipping and naval forces safely and efficiently 
between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, which necessitated passage through the Japanese-
Korean Strait; Japan regarded such close proximity of another Great Power to its home 
islands as a grave strategic threat.  See IAN NISH, THE ORIGINS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE 
WAR 2 (1985) (noting that “Russia wanted naval supremacy in the Korean straits, and 
Japan as an aspiring naval power could not accept that”); id. at 254 (“It is hard to imagine 
[the Russian Admiralty] giving in over Russia’s right to the passage of the seas  around the 
south of Korea”); See also Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, The Russo-Japanese War:  Primary 
Causes of Japanese Success, 58 Naval War College Rev. 11, 22 (2005).    
123 See DOMINIC LIEVEN, TOWARDS THE FLAME: EMPIRE, WAR AND THE END OF TSARIST 
RUSSIA 73-76, 285-87 (2015); SEAN MCMEEKIN, THE RUSSIAN ORIGINS OF THE FIRST 
WORLD War 29-30 (2011); EUGENE ROGAN, THE FALL OF THE OTTOMANS: THE GREAT WAR 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 32-33 (2015).  
124 See RICHARD NED LEBOW, COERCION, COOPERATION, AND ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 93 (2007); Jack S. Levy, Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914, 
15 Int’l Sec. 151, 166 (1990—1991). 
125 See Wilhelm Otto Lampe, The Kiel Canal, in THE BALTIC SEA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
NATIONAL POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 133, 134 (Renate Platzöder & 
Philomène A. Verlaan eds.,1996). 
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then at war with Germany and Italy;
126
 the United States and Iran 
have repeatedly clashed in and around the Strait of Hormuz, through 
which a fifth or more of the world’s oil passes;
127
 during the Cold 
War, the Soviet Union warned the United States against using the 
Vilkitsky Strait, which connects the Kara and Laptev Seas off the 
Arctic coast;
128
 and the strategic importance of the Suez Canal to the 
British Empire,
129
 or of the Panama Canal Zone to the United 
States,
130
 can hardly be questioned.
131
  It would scarcely be 
                                                 
126 M.B., The Status of Tangier, 17 Bull. of Int’l News 1618, 1618 (1940) (confirming that 
Britain feared the loss of “free and unassailable entry to the Straits of Gibraltar [which for 
her was] a primary strategic necessity.”).   
127 See, e.g., Glaser supra note 117, at 127-29; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 
I.C.J. 261 at ¶¶ 23-26; Caitlin Talmadge, Closing Time:  Assessing the Iranian Threat to 
the Strait of Hormuz, 33 Int’l Sec. 82, 82 (2008) (“Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz 
tops the list of global energy security nightmares.”).  
128  See Donat Pharand, Soviet Union Warns United States Against Use of Northeast 
Passage, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 918, 927 (1968). 
129  See AFAF LUTFI SAYYID-MARSOT, A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN EGYPT 74 (1985) 
(explaining the Suez Canal retained its vital interest to Britain even after loss of the Indian 
Empire, leading Britain (joined by France and Israel) to launch  disastrous campaign to 
recover it after Egyptian government confiscated it.).  See also JOHN DARWIN, THE EMPIRE 
PROJECT:  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH WORLD-SYSTEM, 1830-1970, 590-92 (2009). 
130 MAHAN, supra note 120, at 33 (explaining that “The position of the United States with 
reference to [the Panama Canal] will resemble that of England to the Channel, and of the 
Mediterranean countries to the Suez route.”).  Urging Congress to authorize the project of a 
Canal, President William McKinley “showed acute consciousness of [its] strategic 
character;” he told Congress that national policy called for it “more imperatively than 
ever.’” NORMAN J. PADELFORD, THE PANAMA CANAL IN PEACE AND WAR 18, 31 (1943) 
(describing the Canal as “more a military and a political instrument” than a conduit for 
world trade, and insisting that “permanent national interests demand that the United States 
never relax its vigilance for the maintenance and protection of the Panama Canal.”). See 
generally George H.W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Panama (Dec. 20, 1989) (transcript 
available at http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-3422); JOHN MAJOR, 
PRIZE POSSESSION: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE PANAMA CANAL 1903-1979, 
155 (1993) (Asserting that Operation Just Cause, as the United States invasion of Panama 
in 1989 was called, was justified partly in terms of the United States’ continuing security 
interest in the Canal).   
131  The extraordinary strategic sensitivity of both the Suez and Panama Canals was 
underscored by the fact that a special international legal regime was created for each. See 
The S.S. “Wimbledon,” 1923 PCIJ ser. A, No. 1, 26 (Comparing the multilateral 
Convention of Constantinople of 1888, which governed the Suez Canal, prohibiting the 
construction of fortifications commanding that canal; the Anglo-American Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty of 1901, which applied to the Panama Canal, did not forbid the United States to 
erect such fortifications.); See also 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits 
(Resolution adopted July 20, 1936), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1936/1936-
convention-regarding-the-regime-of-the-straits/(a special international legal regime was 
also created for the Dardanelles).    
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remarkable, therefore, if China viewed the Malaccan Strait with 
intense interest.
132
   
American strategists have of course identified China’s 
strategic vulnerability to what they call a “distant blockade” of its 
energy supplies, an instrument of coercion that could be used either 
in the event of war or even to bring extreme pressure on China 
before a war broke out.
133
  Military analyst Aaron Friedberg 
explains that “as part of a distant blockage, U.S. and allied air and 
naval forces (possibly backstopped by land-based anti-ship cruise 
missiles) would seek to prevent shipping bound for China from 
passing through a few narrow choke points far removed from its 
own territory.  The simplest variant of this plan would focus on 
stopping, seizing or diverting large oil tankers as they approached 
the Malacca Strait at the southernmost opening of the South China 
Sea, or the Lombok and Sunda straits that pass between the islands 
of the Indonesian archipelago further to the east.”
134
  Such a naval 
blockade could inflict serious damage on China’s economy and 
would leverage American naval strength, while also avoiding a 
direct attack on Chinese territory and so lowering the risks of 
escalation.
135
   
                                                 
132 Tim Johnson, Remaking World Trade?  China’s Might Driving Plan for Nicaragua 
Canal, Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, (June 19, 2015), available at 
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/nicaragua-central-america-canal-progress-displacement-
environment (Noting that it is not without interest that China is thought to be behind a 
project to build a new canal in Nicaragua; the project has inevitably invited questions about 
China’s motivation:  “Another looming unknown: how the global balance might change 
with a Chinese-built and -financed canal dug across an isthmus that has been a nearly 
exclusive American zone for 200 years.”).   
133 See Gabriel B. Collins & William S. Murray, No Oil for the Lamps of China?, 61 Naval 
War College Rev. 79, 81-89, 92 (2008) (examining the military, political, economic and 
legal aspects of a “distant” blockade)  (“China is not fundamentally vulnerable to a 
maritime energy blockade in circumstances other than global war.”).  United States 
military strategists have also considered a “close” maritime blockade against China, 
seeking to wage a “war of economic strangulation” by denying China the use of the waters 
inside the so-called “first island chain” that surrounds its coast.  See e.g., Eirik Torsvoll, 
Deterring Conflict with China:  A Comparison of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, Offshore 
Control, and Deterrence by Denial, 39 Fletcher F. World Aff. 35, 44-45 (2015).  See 
generally Christopher Michaelson, Maritime Exclusion Zones in Times of Armed Conflict 
at Sea:  Legal Controversies Still Unresolved, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 363 (2003) 
(analyzing the potential legal issues in naval blockades); Sean Mirski, Stranglehold:  The 
Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China, 36 J. 
Strategic Stud. 385 (2013) (studying military and political effects of combining close and 
distant blockades).  
134 FRIEDBERG, BEYOND AIR-SEA BATTLE, supra note 62, at 105-06. 
135 Id. at 107. 
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Further, China is unlikely to concede the United States 
uncontested supremacy over the Asian oceanic rim, the world’s 
most dynamic economic area, accounting for 61% of the global 
population and for 50% of all its commercial shipping, and holding 
substantial reserves of oil and gas.
136
  The “Taiwan Strait Crisis” of 
1995-96 revealed to China’s military the need to develop the 
military technology to counter United States naval predominance in 
the first “island chain” off China’s coast.  Sensing that Taiwan 
might be drifting towards a declaration of independence, China test-
fired unarmed ballistic missiles into the waters off Taiwan.  The 
Clinton Administration responded forcefully by deploying two 
aircraft-carrier battle groups to the area.  Realizing that it might 
eventually have to fight a war with the United States over Taiwan 
and that the United States could deploy overpowering naval forces 
in the Taiwan Strait against it, China began to develop the military 
capabilities needed to contest United States dominance in those 
waters.
137
  China may also want to be able to project its powers 
outside its region, either to protect its growing interests abroad or 
simply to demonstrate its strength to other States.  During the 
Libyan civil war of 2011, the Chinese Navy sent the missile frigate 
Xu Zhou into the Mediterranean, for the stated purpose of 
evacuating Chinese nationals from Libya.
138
  Overall, it appears that 
China is “pursuing a maritime strategy consciously designed to 
achieve near term national security objectives and longer-term 







Furthermore, globalized economic interdependence works 
two ways.  South Korea and Australia, two traditional United States 
                                                 
136 See Prem Mahadevan, Strategic Trends 2013:  Key Developments in Global Affairs, 40 
Center for Strategic Studies 37 (2013).   
137 See FRIEDBERG, BEYOND AIR-SEA BATTLE, supra note 62, at 18-19, 25-8; Torsvoll, 
supra note 133, at 35 (“[China has developed] a vast and complex [missile technology that 
forms] the backbone of what has been labeled anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities [that have] increasingly threaten[ed] the U.S. military’s previously unfettered 
access to the region.”).   
138 Greg Torode & Minnie Chan, PLA Navy sends warship to safeguard Libya evacuees, 
The South China Morning Post, Feb. 26, 2011.   
139 PETER MATTIS, ANALYZING THE CHINESE MILITARY:  A REVIEW ESSAY AND RESOURCE 
GUIDE ON THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 16 (2015) (quoting Bernard Cole, The Great 
Wall at Sea:  China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century 167 (2012)) 
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allies, have so much trade with China that in the event of a conflict 
between China and the United States, they would have to choose 
between abandoning United States military protection or seeing 
their economies crash.  It is not certain how they would choose. 
China’s trade and financial relationships with other nations thus 
gives it extraordinary leverage in dealing with them—and that 
includes the United States.
140
  As other Great Powers have done,
141
 
China could (and does) use the leverage that its trade and financial 
relations give it to secure its most important strategic objectives.
142
 
For instance, in a dispute in 2010 with Japan over the detention of a 
Chinese fishing trawler captain, China blocked exports to Japan of a 
so-called rare earth elements, a vital category of minerals used in 
products including hybrid cars, wind turbines, smartphones and 
                                                 
140  See FELDMAN, supra note 61 at 11-12, 15 (pointing out the devastating economic 
consequences to China of armed conflict with the United States: “[N]ever before has the 
dominant world power been so economically interdependent with the rising challenger it 
must confront.”). 
141 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FREE 
TRADE (1945) (Arguing the commercial policy of Nazi Germany, especially in relation to 
southeastern Europe in the 1930s, was designed to leverage Germany’s trade advantages in 
order to politically control weaker states).  The central idea of Hirschman’s analysis was 
that Germany sought to translate those states’ economic dependence on access to German 
markets into control of their politics and strategy.  If Germany with its vast market could 
largely monopolize the export trade of those smaller economies, they would experience 
great difficulties, including political unrest, if Germany cut off trade with them.  The threat 
of such a cut-off gave Germany a powerful hold over those states’ international behavior.  
Germany was less likely to suffer from the trade interruption than its smaller partners 
because a smaller proportion of the German economy would be engaged in international 
trade.  Once trade dependency was achieved, Germany exploited its market power to create 
both political and economic benefits for itself.  On the economic side, it could impose 
higher tariffs on products in accordance with the level of dependency on the German 
market.  On the political side, the payoff would come in the form of increased ability to 
dominate the smaller state’s military strategy and foreign policy.  Hirschman believed that 
economic nationalism of the kind practiced by Nazi Germany was an inherent 
predisposition of large states, who would always be tempted to use the threat of trade 
interruption as a tool of power politics.  
142 See 2015 Pentagon Report, supra note 22, at 3 (“China has . . . used punitive trade 
policies as instruments of coercion during past tensions, and could do so in future 
disputes.”). Thus in 2011, China used its trading power strategically to force General 
Electric, a major US corporation, to share its advanced avionics technology with a Chinese 
partner and to relocate the manufacturing of its products from the US to China in order to 
be able to sell into the Chinese aircraft and avionics market.  See Clyde Prestowicz, Our 
Incoherent China Policy, in The American Prospect (Fall 2015), available at 
http://prospect.org/article/our-incoherent-china-policy-fall-preview#.Vgf6BSZzIoE.mailto. 
 
The US of course has used trade policy for strategic objectives as well, See Eric 
A. Posner and John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 
(2006). The current exclusion of China from the US-led Transpacific Partnership, 
discussed infra, may well be such a case.   
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  China produces more than 90% of the world’s 
supply of these metals.
144
  In general, “China is aggressively 
asserting its economic clout to win diplomatic allies, invest its vast 
wealth, promote its currency and secure much-needed natural 
resources.”
145
  Effective use of its economic and financial leverage 
would also seem to argue in favor of a policy of pursuing economic 
over military power.  Again, however, China will probably seek to 
grow militarily as well, despite the risks that will ensue from that 
course. 
We also should not assume that the growth of trade between 
China and its major partners will bring about a more peaceable 
security environment. China’s largest regional trading partner is 
Japan.  Trade between China and Japan grew to about $334 billion 
in 2012 even as political relations between the two Asian giants 
were deteriorating.  And the volume of trade between them has 
declined since then, in large part because of political tensions.   
Japanese direct investment in China dropped precipitously in 2013, 
as Japanese firms began shifting capital towards competitors such as 
Vietnam and Indonesia, where anti-Japanese protests are less 
likely.
146
  In any case, although the idea that the growth of 
international trade secures peace between trading partners has had 
important defenders, it seems very doubtful.
147
  Indeed, “economic 
                                                 
143 See Keith Bradsher, Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan, N.Y.TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2010.   
144 See UPDATE 2 – China loses appeal of WTO ruling on rare earth exports, REUTERS, 
Aug. 7, 2014 (Noting that China’s restrictions on the exports of rare earth metals has been 
held to be inconsistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules; in 2014, China lost an 
appeal in the WTO in a suit brought by the United States, Japan and the European Union 
challenging the legality of its restrictions on the export of such metals.  ). See generally 
Reports of the Appellate Body, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare 
Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum, WT/DS5431-3/AB/R (adopted July 14, 2014). 
145 Clifford Krauss & Keith Bradsher, China’s Global Ambitions, With Loans and Strings 
Attached, N.Y.TIMES, July 24, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
07/26/business/international/chinas-global-ambitions-with-loans-and-strings-
attached.html?_r=0.   
146 See Michael Schuman, China and Japan May Not Like Each Other, but They Need 
Each Other, TIME, Dec. 1, 2013, available at http://world.time.com/2013/12/01/china-and-
japan-may-not-like-each-other-but-they-need-each-other.   
147   A sophisticated full-scale study of the question is Dale Copeland, Economic 
Interdependence and War (2014). See also Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion:  Does 
Trade Promote Peace? (2005) (empirical evidence does not support thesis that trade 
interdependence tends to reduce militarized conflict); David Rowe, The Tragedy of 
Liberalism:  How Globalization Caused the First World War, 14 SECURITY STUD. 407 
(2005); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Myth of National Interdependence, in Realism and 
International Politics 152-65 (2008).  For a review of the “peace through trade” theory, see 
Robert J. Delahunty, Trade, War, and Terror: A Reply to Bhala, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 161 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/2
2015]   TOWARDS A CONCERT OF ASIA                39 
 
interdependence may heighten rather than defuse political 
tensions.”
148
   
Nonetheless, China’s military expansion should not be 
attributed to inherent aggressiveness, desire for domination, or even 
radical dissatisfaction with the current world order.149  Rather, we 
could view it as a natural response to the risk that a coalition is 
gradually forming to balance against it.150  China is understandably 
beginning to feel itself increasingly surrounded by potential 
adversaries, not least of them the United States, which it believes 
may be subtly pursuing a policy of “containment.”  These fears have 
become more acute since the start of the so-called “Pivot to Asia” 
under the present United States Administration.151  For one China 
observer, “U.S. military strategy in East Asia seems calculated to 
inflame relations with China . . . American provocation transcends 
presidencies:  it was evident under Clinton and George W. Bush and 
it continues under Obama.”152 
 
China’s Rivalry with Japan 
Obviously, too, Chinese leaders and private citizens view 
with dismay Japan’s expensive rearmament program; the Japanese 
                                                                                                               
(2011).  If anything should discredit the idea that economic interdependence will bring 
about peace, it is surely the frequency of civil war.   
148 Denny Roy, Hegemon on the Horizon?  China’s Threat to East Asian Security, 19 INT’L 
SEC. 149, 158 (1994). 
149 See Dingding Chen & Xiaoyu Pu. Debating China’s Assertiveness, 38 INT’L SEC. 176, 
177 (2013/4).  
150 John Mearsheimer, Can China Rise Peacefully?, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Oct. 25, 
2014, available at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204.  
(“[A]lmost anything China does to improve its military capabilities will be seen in Beijing 
as defensive in nature, but in Tokyo, Hanoi, and Washington it will appear offensive in 
nature. That means China’s neighbors are likely to interpret any steps it takes to enhance 
its military posture as evidence that Beijing not only is bent on acquiring significant 
offensive capabilities but has offensive intentions as well. And that includes instances 
where China is merely responding to steps taken by its neighbors or the United States to 
enhance their fighting power”).  
151  On the “pivot,” see CRS Report for Congress, Pivot to the Pacific?  The Obama 
Administration’s “Rebalancing” toward Asia, March 28, 2012, available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf.  But President Obama seems to be reconsidering 
the “pivot,” see Francis Fukuyama, Dealing with China, HOOVER INSTITUTION (2014), 
available at http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/fukuyama_dealingwithchina.pdf, and 
it is unclear whether the Obama Administration intends to carry through on the “pivot.”  
See Zachary Keck, Can the U.S. Afford the Asia Pivot?, THE DIPLOMAT, March 5, 2014, 
available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/can-the-us-afford-the-asia-pivot/.  Chinese 
strategists had seen United States moves in Asia as menacing even before the pivot, 
however.  See Friedberg, supra note 1, at 23-24.  
152 Beardson, supra note 1, at 273. 
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Cabinet’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, 
which is entitled “Renunciation of War”153; Japan’s emerging trade 
                                                 
153 On the background of the adoption of this provision, see James E. Auer, Article Nine 
of Japan’s Constitution:  From Renunciation of Armed Force “Forever” to the Third 
Largest Defense Budget in the World, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172-76 (1990).  
Article 9 was drafted, ratified and promulgated in 1946, largely under pressure from 
General Douglas MacArthur, then the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) in occupied Japan.  MacArthur originally directed that the provision preclude 
Japan from recourse to war “even for preserving its own security,” id. at 173, but that 
language was eventually deleted.  Since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, 
Article 9 has been interpreted “flexibly.”  See id. at 176-81; Robert A. Fisher, The 
Erosion of Japanese Pacifism: The Constitutionality of the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense 
Guidelines, 32 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 393, 397-99 (1999).  The Japanese Supreme Court 
has rejected the argument that Article 9 prohibits Japan from engaging in self-defense 
that is legitimate under international law, see the 1959 Sunakawa Case, English trans. at 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=13; see also Alfred C. 
Oppler, The Sunakawa Case:  Its Legal and Political Implications, 76 POL. SC1. Q. 241 
(1961) (stationing of United States forces consistent with War Renunciation Clause); 
Theodore McNelly, The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution, 77 POL. SCI. 
Q. 350 (1962) (background of Article 9).  And Japan has long maintained a military in 
the form of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF), whose constitutionality under 
Article 9 the Japanese courts have avoided questioning.  See Michael A. Panton, 
Politics, Practice and Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 11 
ASIA-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 163, 212-4 (2010) (reviewing case law); Glenn D. Hook & 
Gavan McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and analysis 16-17 
(2001) (same); Auer, supra note 150, at 181-83 (same); Fisher, supra note 53, at 409-14 
(same); Hideo Wada, Decisions Under Article 9 of the Constitution – The Sunakawa, 
Eniwa and Naganuma Decisions, 9 LAW JAPAN 117 (1976) (same).  Until recently, 
however, Japanese governments have insisted that the JSDF will be deployed only in 
defense of Japan itself.  See JAPAN, ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION (2006), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/japan-constitution-article9.pdf 
(comprehensive review of legal and policy issues).   
In July, 2014, however, the Japanese Cabinet under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed 
itself to be willing to engage in collective self-defense together with a nation with which it 
has a “close relationship” in circumstances in which the survival of the Japanese nation is 
at risk.  See CABINET DECISION ON DEVELOPMENT OF SEAMLESS SECURITY LEGISLATION TO 
ENSURE JAPAN’S SURVIVAL AND PROTECT ITS PEOPLE (July 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e_000273.html. This document should be read 
together with Japan’s NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (December, 2013), available at 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.  In these two documents, the 
Japanese government expresses deep anxiety over the current state of the international 
security environment in East Asia.  Japan’s new policy is by no means a radical departure 
from its earlier, evolving practices.  See William Choong, Defense and Japan’s 
Constitutional Debate, 57 SURVIVAL 173, 181 (2015) (“In the light of Japan’s gradual 
process of normalization and remilitarization to date, the current push to embrace 
collective self-defense should be seen as more evolutionary than revolutionary.”); see also 
Eisuke Suzuki, Japan:  Farewell to ‘One Country Pacifism,’ THE DIPLOMAT, Aug. 31, 
2015, available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/japan-farewell-to-one-country-pacifism/ 
(arguing that Japan is “moving, however slowly, in the appropriate direction of re-molding 
Japan into a normal country that is internationally responsible for its conduct”). But the 
Japanese Cabinet’s “reinterpretation” of the nation’s Constitution has caused shock waves 
in China and elsewhere in Asia.   
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and security arrangements with the United States and Australia154; 
and the developing “strategic partnership” between Japan and 
India.155  Nationalistic feelings, moreover, are currently at very high 
levels among young people in both China and Japan.156  A poll taken 
                                                                                                               
 
Thereafter, in April 2015, the United States and Japan promulgated revised “Defense 
Guidelines.”  See GUIDELINES FOR U.S. JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, Apr. 27, 2015, 
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_--_GUIDELINES_FOR_U.S.-
JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION.pdf.  Originally issued in 1979 and revised after the 
end of the Cold War in 1997, the updated Guidelines are designed to provide for the closer 
integration of the two nations’ military forces.  See James J. Przystup, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, The U.S.-Japan Alliance:  Review of the Guidelines for Defense 
Cooperation (2015), available at http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents 
/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-18.pdf; Yuki Tatsumi, 4 Takeaways from the 
New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, THE DIPLOMAT, Apr. 29, 2015, available at 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/4-takeaways-from-the-new-us-japan-defense-guidelines/.  
Chinese leaders have denounced this new mutual security arrangement.  See Shannon 
Tiezzi, China Decries New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, THE DIPLOMAT, May 1, 2015, 
available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-decries-new-us-japan-defense-
guidelines/.  The South Korean government has also indicated concern. See Tae-Jun Kang, 
South Korea Frets Over U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, THE DIPLOMAT , April 28, 2015, 
available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-korea-frets-over-us-japan-defense-
guidelines/.  More recently still, the Japanese Diet has enacted legislation authorizing the 
use of Japanese forces in armed combat abroad, against provoking concern from both its 
neighbors and much of the Japanese public.  See Jonathan Soble, Japan’s Parliament 
Approves Overseas Combat Role for Military, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/world/asia/japan-parliament-passes-legislation-
combat-role-for-military.html?_r=0.   
154 See Bill Merkle, Japan’s New Geopolitics, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Aug. 13, 2015, 
available at http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/japans-new-geopolitics-13566.  
155 The Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership 
was issued on September 1, 2014. While not a mutual defense treaty, the Declaration 
clearly contemplates closer military ties between Japan and India.  One clause states: 
  
11. The two Prime Ministers affirmed their shared belief that at a time 
of growing turmoil, tensions and transitions in the world, a closer and 
stronger strategic partnership between India and Japan is indispensable 
for a prosperous future for their two countries and for advancing peace, 
stability and prosperity in the world, in particular, in the inter-
connected Asia, Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. Prime Minister 
Abe briefed Prime Minister Modi on Japan's policy of "Proactive 
Contribution to Peace" and Japan's Cabinet Decision on development 
of seamless security legislation. Prime Minister Modi supported 
Japan's initiative to contribute to peace and stability of the region and 
the world. 
 
For an analysis of the deepening ties between India and Japan, see Brahma Chellaney, 
Asia’s Best Friends Shape an Axis, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014, available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/09/02/commentary/japan-commentary/asias-
best-friends-shape-an-axis/#.VCwWAv0o45s.   
156 See Fukuyama, Dealing with China, supra note 148, at 3. 
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in 2014 revealed that most Chinese, and nearly a third of the 
Japanese, expect a war between the two countries.157  The underlying 
cause of the growing tension between China and Japan is not so 
much about territory as position: their rival claims to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands may provide a trigger, but the deeper 
quarrel is over their relative place in Asia’s hierarchy.158  China’s 
relations with other Asian nations, including Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia have also been 
deteriorating, 159  although those developments may be offset by 
China’s growing closeness to Russia 160  (its main partner in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization161) and even, to some degree, to 
South Korea 162  and Taiwan. 163  Most of all, however, China is 
                                                 
157 See Zachary Keck, Most Chinese Expect War with Japan, THE DIPLOMAT, Sept. 11, 
2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/poll-majority-of-chinese-expect-war-
with-japan/.   
158 See generally Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals:  Japanese Domestic Politics and a 
Rising China 4-9, 20-3 (2015); James Holmes, Asia’s Worst Nightmare:  A China-Japan 
War, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Oct. 26, 2014, available at http://nationalinterest.org/ 
commentary/asias-ultimate-nightmare-china-japan-war-9662?page=show.  Nations fight 
over rank and status, perhaps even more often than they do over land, resources, or other 
material goods.  See Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight:  Past and Future Motives for 
War (2010).   
159 On the military and political responses of the United States and four of China’s near 
neighbors (Australia, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore) to China’s growing military prowess, 
see Liff & Ikenberry, supra note 24, at 69-86.   
160 See Pepe Escobar, The birth of a Eurasian century, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May 19, 
2014, available at http://mondediplo.com/openpage/the-birth-of-a-eurasian-century; 
Dingding Chen, Are Russia and China Moving Toward a Formal Alliance? THE DIPLOMAT, 
May 30, 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/are-china-and-russia-moving-
toward-a-formal-alliance/.  In a televised appearance on April 17, 2014, Russia’s President 
Vladimir Putin said:  “Are there plans to establish new blocs? I don’t know; we haven’t 
thought about this. But it is absolutely clear that we will be expanding collaboration with 
China. Our trade with the United States is 27.5 [billion], but trade with China is 87 billion, 
and it is growing. And experts will agree that China is gradually becoming the number one 
economic power. The question is when it will happen: in 15, 20 or 25 years. But everybody 
understands that it is inevitable.”  Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA, 
Apr. 17, 2014, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034.   
161 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has been described as “a sort of anti-NATO, 
which functions partly to put a spoke in America’s wheel, but also allows China and 
Russia to jockey for position in Central Asia.”  Beardson,  supra note 1, at 278.  
162  See Scott A. Snyder, Can Beijing and Seoul Become Strategic Partners?, THE 
DIPLOMAT, July 16, 2014,  available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/can-beijing-and-
seoul-become-strategic-partners/.  South Korea has been pursuing a policy of “strategic 
hedging” between the United States and China for some time. See Robert S. Ross, 
Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia in Balance of Power:  Theory and Practice in the 
21st Century, at 267, 270 (T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz & Michael Fortmann eds., 2004).  
163 See Coker, Improbable War, supra note 12, at 114-15; Westad, supra note 37, at 393-
94; Jonathan Sullivan, Taiwan and China Edge Ever Closer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, 
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concerned with the possibility of deepening American antagonism, 
which it sees reflected in the closer ties the United States is 
developing militarily and otherwise with several of China’s more 
powerful or more hostile neighbors, including Japan, India, 164 
Korea, 165  and Vietnam (where deadly anti-Chinese riots have 
occurred in 2014).166  For example, the United States and Vietnam 
have drawn closer on a variety of fronts since the two nations 
entered into diplomatic relations in 1995, and a Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement between them was signed this year.167 
We are thus seeing what looks like the beginning of an arms 
race in east and south Asia.  Consider the matter of naval 
armaments. 168   The United States and its Allies have maintained 
naval supremacy in Asia since the end of the Second World War; 
but the situation is increasingly competitive and dynamic.  
According to The Japan Times: 
 
China’s submarine fleet . . . is projected to match U.S. 
numbers by 2020, at 78 vessels each. Many of the 
Chinese submarines will be stationed at a giant 
underwater base on Hainan Island, which juts into the 
South China Sea. 
China’s moves have spurred a submarine shopping spree 
across Asia. 
This year, Vietnam received the third of six 
submarines it ordered from Russia plus maritime 
                                                                                                               
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/opinion/taiwan-and-china-edge-ever-
closer.html.   
164 See Kupchan, supra note 72, at 83-84. 
165 For a useful and current review of South Korea’s relations with China, Japan and the 
United States, see Richard Weitz, Strategic Posture Review:  South Korea, WORLD 
POLITICS REVIEW, Sept. 18, 2014, available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ 
articles/14076/strategic-posture-review-south-korea.  In the author’s opinion, the United 
States-South Korea alliance remains “healthy” and now extends beyond the mere 
protection of South Korea itself.   
166  Jonathan Kaiman & Kate Hodal, Anti-China riots turn deadly in Vietnam, THE 
GUARDIAN, May 15, 2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014 
/may/15/anti-china-riots-turn-deadly-in-vietnam.   
167 See MARY BETH D. NIKITIN, MARK E. MANYIN & MARK HOLT, CONG. RESEARCH  SERV., 
R43433, U.S.-VIETNAM NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT:  ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 
(2014), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43433.pdf.   
168 Emerging arms races can be found in other potential theaters of conflict, including, 
alarmingly, outer space.  See Coker, Improbable War, supra note 12, at 163-70.   
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patrol aircraft capable of hunting down Chinese subs. 
Russia is the top military exporter to Asia, followed 
by the U.S. and then European countries such as the 
Netherlands. 
Over the summer, Vietnamese and Chinese ships 
rammed each other repeatedly after China moved an 
oil rig into waters claimed by both countries. 
Vietnam’s military spending expanded by 83 percent 
over the past five years, making up 8 percent of 
government spending. 
Similarly, Japan is replacing its entire fleet with more 
modern submarines, South Korea is adding bigger 
attack submarines and India plans to build six new 
subs.169 
III. An Asian Security Dilemma? 
 
International relations theorists have analyzed the kind of 
situation that exists in East Asia as a variant of what they call the 
“Thucydidean trap” or the “security dilemma.” 170   The security 
dilemma is a situation in which even non-hostile States interested 
only in their own preservation and with no desire to attack other 
States can find themselves on the path to war. The essential 
postulates of the security dilemma are these:  1) a condition of 
international “anarchy,” meaning only the absence of any authority 
that transcends and controls individual States; 2) the consequent 
need for each State to depend on itself (or its allies) for its security; 
3) uncertainty regarding the present or future intentions of other 
States; 4) the risk of destruction if a State fails to prepare for the 
aggressive or predatory actions of other States.  In those conditions, 
States will take precautionary actions, such as armaments programs 
and alliances, to protect themselves against present or anticipated 
threats from other States.  Because of the uncertainty of the 
intentions of other States, the difficulty of distinguishing between 
                                                 
169 Asian nations stock up on weapons to counter China’s might, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2014, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/09/13/asia-pacific/asian-
nations-stock-up-on-weapons-to-counter-chinas-might/#.VElJ7f0o45s.   
170 See Coker, Improbable War, supra note 12, 105-09 (applying concept to United States-
China relations). 
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offensive and defensive weapons, and the tendency to assume a 
“worst case” outcome in a context of extreme uncertainty, even 
defensively motivated actions by another State will trigger alarm 
and be perceived as threatening the security of the State that 
observes them.  The “threatened” State will respond with measures 
of like kind, generating an escalating pattern of mutual suspicion 
and mistrust, preparations for war and, often, armed conflict.171  The 
security dilemma is a path that can lead to war:  as one strategic 
analyst put it, the security dilemma “is, in essence, an amplifier of 
anxieties, in which the defensive exertions of the participants 
stimulate each other and feedback upon themselves.”172 
The concept of a “security dilemma,” though it cannot 
explain the origins of all wars, has been central to much American 
international relations scholarship. 173   John Mearsheimer’s The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), a major study in 
international relations theory, starts from the security dilemma.  
Mearsheimer says: 
 
                                                 
171 For a brief analysis of the security dilemma, see Jack S. Levy, War and Peace, in 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 350, 353-54 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse 
& Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002) [hereinafter Levy, War and Peace].  See also Liff & 
Ikenberry, supra note 24, at 58-61 (defining original concept of security dilemma and 
explaining later refinements).  For a full-length treatment, see Ken Booth & Nicholas J. 
Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (2008).  
See also John Herz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, 2 WORLD 
POLITICS 157 (1950); reprinted in John H. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World 
Politics: Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century 72–98 (1976).  Early 
formulations of the security dilemma can be discerned in Thucydides, History of the 
Peloponnesian War, Bk. I, ¶ 23, and in Machiavelli, The Prince, Ch. III.  For later accounts, 
applications and criticisms of the security dilemma, see, e.g. John J. Mearsheimer, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001); Charles L. Glaser, The Security Dilemma 
Revisited, 50 WORLD POLITICS 171 (1997) [hereafter, Glaser, Security Dilemma Revisited]; 
Robert Jervis, Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War, 16 POLI. SCI. Q. 239 (1993); 
Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POLITICS 167, 181 
(1978); Randall L. Schweller, Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias:  What Security Dilemma?, 5 
SEC. STUD. 90 (1991).     
172 Aaron Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry:  Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, 18 INT’L 
SECURITY 5, 28 (1992/3).   
173  See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception:  The Spiral of International 
Insecurity, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 201(William Olson, 
David McLellan & Fred Sondermann eds., 6th ed., 1983); Charles L. Glaser, Security 
Dilemma Revisited, supra note 173, at 172 (“We can . . . appreciate the importance and 
impact of security dilemma and offense-defense arguments by realizing that scholars have 
now employed these arguments effectively to address many of the most important 
questions of international relations theory and security policy”).   
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The essence of the [security] dilemma is that the 
measures a state takes to increase its own security 
usually decrease the security of other states.  Thus, it 
is difficult for a state to increase its own chances of 
survival without threatening the survival of other 
states.  John Herz first introduced the security 
dilemma in a 1950 article in the journal World 
Politics.[174]  After discussing the anarchic nature of 
international politics, he writes, “Striving to attain 
security from . . . attack, [states] are driven to acquire 
more and more power in order to escape the impact 
of the power of others.  This, in turn, renders the 
others more insecure and compels them to prepare 
for the worst.  Since none can ever feel entirely 
secure in such a world of competing units, power 
competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security 
and power accumulation is on.”  The implication of 
Herz’s analysis is clear:  the best way for a state to 
survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states 
and gain power at their expense.  The best defense is 
a good offense.  Since this message is widely 
understood, ceaseless security competition ensues.  
Unfortunately, little can be done to ameliorate the 
security dilemma as long as states operate in 
anarchy.175 
 
Bear in mind, moreover, that the “security dilemma” in its 
pure form describes the situation of States that are not hostile to 
each other.  In the case of East Asia, however, there are already 
antagonisms between several of the relevant States—China and 
Japan; China and Vietnam, China and India176—that exacerbate the 
                                                 
174 John Herz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, 2 WORLD POLITICS 157 
(1950), reprinted in John H. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics:  
Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century (1976).  
175 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 35-36 (2001). 
176 Brahma Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India, and Japan 169 (2006) 
(“Sharing one of the world’s longest and most rugged frontiers, China and India are the 
only two countries today without a fully defined frontline.”). Yet after three decades of 
negotiation, the two powers have failed to resolve their disagreements; in fact, China may 
want an unsettled border in order to pin down large numbers of Indian Army troops who 
could otherwise serve on India’s border with Pakistan. Id. at 170-1.  Most astonishingly, 
China lays claim to the northeastern Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh, id. at 174, 
where the two nations continue to have episodic military confrontations. See India-China 
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difficulty of avoiding conflict between them.  Thus, the “security 
dilemma” cannot explain all of the increasing tension and military 
build-up in the East Asian region—even if it can explain much of 
them.177 
States that find themselves in a security dilemma search for 
ways out of their predicament.  One common escape device is to 
enter into military alliances with other States that they consider 
friendly, or at least as fearful of a common threat as they are.  
Banded together with allied States, a State may be more confident 
about its own security:  combined with the forces of the other States, 
it may be able to withstand, or even overcome, the State that it 
regards as threatening.  The problem is, however, that alliance 
formation may simply recreate the security dilemma at a higher 
level.  For if State A, considering B to be a danger to its security, 
allies with C to check that danger, then B, fearing the combined 
force of A and C, may ally with D as a counter-measure.  The 
security dilemma, in other words, can lead through the process of 
alliance formation to the construction of a balance of power system, 
with all its inherent instability.    
In these difficult circumstances, the main players in the 
Asian strategic environment, including the United States, are 
apparently being drawn, almost irresistibly, towards a deepening 
security dilemma and eventually, therefore, into a tense and 
unsteady balance of power system.  The Obama Administration’s 
                                                                                                               
Border Dispute, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/india-
china_conflicts.htm; see also China’s Arunachal Pradesh Fixation, THE DIPLOMAT (Dec. 16, 
2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-arunachal-pradesh-fixation/.   
177 Liff and Ikenberry usefully distinguish between two basic competitive strategic settings 
in which military competition (including arms races) occurs:  that of the traditional, 
idealized security dilemma (where both states are security seekers motivated by mistrust 
and uncertainty but not wishing to upset the international status quo), and a second 
situation in which the states do have a direct conflict of interest (say, over territory or some 
other material issue) and in which one or both of them seek changes in the status quo in a 
fundamentally zero-sum manner.  See Liff & Ikenberry, supra note 24, at 63-64.  They 
discern elements of both types of military competition in China’s current relations with its 
neighbors:  thus, China’s relationship with Australia approximates to that of a pure security 
dilemma; its relationship to Vietnam incorporates more direct conflicts of interest; its 
relation to Japan stands somewhere in between.  They conclude that “[t]raditional, full-
scale security dilemma-induced arms races do not appear to be occurring—at least not yet.  
Nevertheless, there is evidence of a security-driven spiral gradually unfolding between 
China and several states that is driving investments in military capabilities and that may 
worsen significantly in the years ahead.”  Id. at 88.  
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“pivot to Asia” seems to be a step in that direction.
178
  So, too, are 
calls in the United States for the creation of an “Asian NATO.”
179
  
And the Trans-Pacific Trade Pact (TPP), a United States-supported 
trade agreement that would cover some 40% of United States 
imports and exports and that currently includes twelve Pacific-rim 
nations (but which China was not invited to join) can be considered 
the economic component of the “pivot”:
180
 it has been described as 
“one of the pillars of U.S. rebalancing strategy in the Asia Pacific 
[that] is trying to create a club that excludes China.”
181
  Thus, China 
                                                 
178 The “pivot” seems to have been designed as a “strategic marketing exercise,” intended 
to avoid the appearance of United States weakness after the American withdrawals from 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Hayton, supra note 94, at 200.   
179  Shigeru Ishiba, the Secretary General of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party and a former 
Defense Minister, has called for “an Asian version of NATO.”  See Shigeru Ishiba, Asia 
needs body like NATO, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 6, 2014, available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/03/06/national/politics-diplomacy/ishiba-asia-
needs-body-like-nato/#.VdxyXf0o6M8; see also Zachary Keck, Is an Asian NATO 
Possible?, THE DIPLOMAT, Apr. 17, 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/is-
an-asian-nato-possible/.  On Chinese concerns about an “Asian NATO,” see Jonathan 
Ward, Chinese Analysts Interpret Modi’s New India, CHINA BRIEF, June 19, 2014, at 8-11, 
available at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/China_Brief_Vol_14_ 
Issue_12___.pdf. 
180 See Hayton, supra note 94, 205-206. 
181  Jonathan Soble, Failure of Obama’s Trans-Pacific Trade Deal Could Hurt U.S. 
Influence in Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 16, 2015, (quoting Song Guoyou, Professor at the 
Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/asia/obama-trans-pacific-partnership-
asia.html?_r=0.  Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinforced this perception by telling 
the US Congress in April 2015 that the TPP was not only about trade but also “about our 
security. . . Long term, its strategic value is awesome.”  Id.  In a similar vein, US Secretary 
of Defense Ash Carter said (shortly before a visit to Japan) that the TPP was “as important 
to me another aircraft carrier.” Jacob M. Schlesinger & Mitsuru Obe, TPP:  Momentum on 
Trade Deal Bolsters U.S., Japan Efforts to Counter China, WALL ST. J., April 17, 2015, 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/tpp-momentum-on-trade-deal-bolsters-u-s-japan-
efforts-to-counter-china-1429249448.  The strategic value of the TPP to the US has been 
explained as follows: 
 
Besides creating jobs, the TPP may also alter the balance of power in 
the Asia-Pacific. The treaty will increase the rate of economic growth 
in the United States and in an array of friendly nations while 
simultaneously diverting trade flows away from Washington’s greatest 
competitor, China. More important than any of these absolute changes 
in economic output, though, is the relative change in national power, 
itself the product of economic might. Whereas trade is often discussed 
in absolute terms, relative gains are more important in the often zero-
sum world of international politics. If the TPP can change the 
trajectory of American power relative to China’s, it may be the single 
most important factor in whether the United States retains its 
“indispensable” role in the 21st Century. 
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could fairly infer that the United States and its allies are developing 
a two-pronged strategy—military and economic—for countering its 
rise.  On the other side, China’s growing friendship and 
collaboration with Russia can be interpreted as an early stage in the 
formation of an opposing power bloc.  In other words, the world 
seem to be starting out on a path that could well lead to major war in 
Asia.  Certainly the precedents are alarming. 
   
Wars of hegemonic transition 
It gets even worse.  The risk of eventual major war with 
China appears significant, not only from the perspective of “balance 
of power” theory, but also from that of its leading “structuralist” 
rival, “power transition” theory.
182
  
Some leading international relations theorists (within the 
broader school of thought called “realists”) have argued for the 
theory that major wars often arise during periods of “power 
transition,” in which a previously dominant but declining hegemon 
attacks, or is attacked by, a rising hegemon seeking to displace it.
183
  
Jack Levy, a leading international relations scholar, explains the 
power-transition theory as follows: 
                                                                                                               
Sean Mirski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership:  China, America, and the Balance of Power, 
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Jul. 5, 2015, available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/the-trans-pacific-partnership-china-america-the-
balance-13264.  Likewise, the TPP is intended to jump-start Japan’s economic growth, and 
thus contribute to maintaining Japanese power and the centrality of the US-Japan alliance 
in East Asia.  See Hayley Channer, How Japan Can Support America’s Pivot:  TPP and a 
Strong Economy, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, May 19, 2014, available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-japan-can-support-americas-pivot-tpp-strong-
economy-10488.  
However, China has apparently expressed some interest in joining the TPP at a later stage, 
indicating that it does not necessarily regard the agreement as threatening.  See Victor 
Beattie, Obama:  China ‘Put Out Feelers’ on Joining TPP, THE VOICE OF AMERICA, Jun. 4, 
2015, available at http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-china-put-out-feelers-about-
joining-tpp/2806949.html. 
182  Balance of power and power transition together form “the two major strands of 
structural theorizing” in international relations.  “Power transition theories suggest that 
hegemony, rather than balance, is the natural state of affairs in the international system.  
Conflict arises when an existing hegemon’s power inevitably wanes relative to some 
upcoming challenger.”  The theories differ in that “balance of power sees stability when 
power levels near, while transitionism views this situation as fraught with conflict 
potential.”  JOHN ARQUILLA, DUBIOUS BATTLES:  AGGRESSION, DEFEAT, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 10 (1992).   
183  See, e.g., DALE C. COPELAND, THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR (2000) (arguing that 
declining hegemons tend to cause preventive wars); ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN 
WORLD POLITICS (1981). 
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Hegemons commonly arise and use their strength to 
create a set of political and economic structures and 
norms of behavior that enhances the stability of the 
system at the same time that it advances their own 
security.  Differential rates of growth lead to the rise 
and fall of hegemons . . . and the probability of a 
major war is greatest at the point when the declining 
leader is being overtaken by the rising challenger.  
Either the challenger initiates a war to bring the 
benefits from the system into line with its rising 
military power, or the declining leader initiates a 
preventive war to block the rising challenger while 
the opportunity is still available.
184
 
The British Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century can be seen as a declining hegemon, whose supremacy was 
being challenged by two rising hegemons, Germany and the United 
States.  Interestingly, the liberal international order that Britain 
created and sustained as a hegemon, which provided conditions 
highly favorable to economic growth and international trade, also 
made possible the rise of the German and American challengers to 
Britain.  Britain was eventually able to beat back the German 
challenge, but only at the cost of fighting two major wars that 
exhausted it and brought about the loss of its hegemonic position.  
Britain managed the power transition to American hegemony 
peacefully, without having to go to war; but it important to recall 
that Anglo-American relations in the late nineteenth century were 
not always easy, and that the United States demanded that Britain 
give up any thoughts it might have had to playing a leading role in 
the affairs of this hemisphere.  As United States Secretary of State 
Richard Olney wrote in a dispatch to Britain during the 1895 Anglo-
American dispute over Venezuela’s borders, “today the United 
States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law 
upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.”
185
 Despite 




                                                 
184 Levy, War and Peace, supra note 171, at 355. 
185 See, e.g., R.A. HUMPHREYS, ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRIES AND THE VENEZUELA CRISIS 
OF 1895, 17 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC. 131, 150 (1967).   
186 Id. at 163.  For a full account of Britain’s strategic objectives and diplomatic methods in 
relation to the United States in the Venezuelan boundary dispute and other controversies 
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The rise of the United States and Germany and the decline of 
Britain illustrate that power transitions to a new hegemonic order 
may, but need not, lead to war.  They also show that merely by their 
success in establishing a secure and stable global order, hegemons 
may create the conditions in which powerful challengers to that 
order may emerge.  The United States-dominated global order 
undoubtedly provided the environment in which China could rise 
and become a challenger.  The key question is whether the power-
transition that seems to be underway now will result in war between 
the United States and China or not.  And even if it does not lead to 
war, might it lead to the practical exclusion of the United States 
from the affairs of East Asia, as the aggressive United States 
application of the Monroe Doctrine led to Britain’s practical 
exclusion from the affairs of the Western hemisphere?   
The historical record is discouraging.  Harvard’s Richard 
Rosecrance has argued that of the thirteen challenges to hegemony 
since 1500, ten have resulted in major war.
187
  (The three he 
identifies that did not were the United States challenge to Britain in 
the late 19
th
 century; the Soviet challenge to the United States in the 
Cold War; and—oddly—the Japanese challenge in the 1980s to the 
Soviets.)  Among power transitions that did lead to hegemonic wars 
are the Dutch challenge to Spain in the seventeenth century; the 
British challenge to the Dutch in the eighteenth century; the French 
challenges to the British in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries; and the German challenges to Britain in the twentieth 
century.  
In these unpropitious circumstances, is it imaginable that 
there might be a “Concert of Asia,” modeled on the successful 
nineteenth century Concert of Europe?   
 
IV. A Concert of Asia? 
In a brilliant, original and provocative book, the highly 
regarded Australian strategist Hugh White has argued for a “Concert 
of Asia,” modeled on the early nineteenth century Concert of 
Europe.
188
  If one of the most compelling duties of international 
                                                                                                               
between the two states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see STEPHEN R. 
ROCK, APPEASEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 25-47 (2000).  
187 See ROSECRANCE, RESURGENCE, supra note 56, at 94-95 & 185-186 n.1.   
188 White, supra note 11. White is not the only important international relations theorist to 
argue for a “grand bargain” with China in which the United States accepts the necessity of 
fundamental alterations in the East Asian strategic environment.  For example, Charles 
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relations theorists and of international lawyers is to try 
conceptualize institutional arrangements that will maintain the peace 
of nations,
189
 White discharges that duty in a most impressive way. 
In essence, White is proposing a power-sharing arrangement 
designed to resolve the disputes that might lead to Great Power 
armed conflict and so maintain the peace and stability of East Asia.  
The two central pillars of the proposed Concert would be China and 
the United States, but they would be joined by two other Great 
Powers, India and Japan.
190
  White writes: 
 
The central idea of this book is that such an 
understanding its possible today between the United 
States and China . . .  [T]he best way for America to 
respond to China’s growing power is to agree with 
China to share the leadership of Asia.  This kind of 
order is hard to imagine, harder still to achieve, and 
if achieved, it would be difficult to maintain.  It 
would hardly be worth considering if the 
alternatives were not so bad.  But if there is any way 
to avoid both the dangers of Chinese domination 
and the risks of rivalry, it will be through a new 
order in which China’s authority and influence grow 
enough to satisfy the Chinese, and America’s role 




White fully recognizes the extreme difficulty of achieving 
such a power-sharing relationship.  It would involve, he admits, 
diplomacy of the highest order, of a kind the world has not seen for 
decades.  The two major States involved, the United States and 
China, would have to reach a common understanding as to the scope 
and limits of their powers.  They would, for a start, have to 
                                                                                                               
Glaser has proposed that the United States negotiate an agreement with China that ends the 
American commitment to defend Taiwan.  See GLASER, U.S.-CHINA GRAND BARGAIN, 
supra note 62.  Interesting as Glaser’s proposal is, there is insufficient space to explore it 
here.     
189  See Benjamin Miller, Is peace possible—and how? The four-fold response of 
international relations theory, 63 INT’L J. 163 (2009/10). 
190 Despite their obvious vulnerabilities, both Japan and India continue to rank among the 
world’s Great Powers.   See Walter Russell Mead, The Seven Great Powers, THE 
AMERICAN INTEREST, Jan., 2015, available at http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2015/01/04/the-seven-great-powers/.   
191 Id. at 126. 
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acknowledge that each other’s basic objectives are legitimate.  For 
China, that would mean accepting a continuing American presence 
in East Asia and an important influence on events in that region; for 
the United States, it would mean acceptance of the fact that as 
China’s power grows, its demands for greater authority and 
influence in the region are legitimate. 
To reach such an agreement, both China and the United 
States would have to make major concessions.  Perhaps the most 
significant of these is that each side would have to accept the other 
as an equal.  China would have to abandon any thought of a return 
to something like the classic “tributary system” in East Asia, in 
which it held unchallenged dominance over its near neighbors 
(excepting Japan), and which provided a comprehensive order 
within which the military, diplomatic and trade relations subsisting 
in East Asia were conducted.  Or, to put the matter in terms more 
familiar to Americans, China would have to forego any idea of a 
“Monroe Doctrine” for East Asia
192
 that excluded the United States 
from the region.
193
  For its part, the United States would have to 
give up any attempt to destabilize or change China’s form of 
government:  it would have to accept CPC control of China as 
permanent and legitimate, even if that meant that China remained 
persistently undemocratic.  The United States would also have to 
dial down, though not silence, its criticism of China’s human rights 
practices and policies.  Both these choices would be extremely hard 
for the United States to make ideologically.
194
  Furthermore, just as 
China would have to agree not to seek primacy in the region, so too 
would the United States.  Any American attempt at “containing” 
China would have to be set aside.  Both sides would have to agree, 
                                                 
192 John Mearsheimer forecasts that outcome as a long-term goal for China, should its 
economic growth continue.  “A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to 
push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region, much as the United States pushed the 
European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We 
should expect China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as imperial Japan 
did in the 1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. For example, 
Chinese leaders have made it clear they do not think the United States has a right to 
interfere in disputes over the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea, a strategically 
important body of water that Beijing effectively claims as its own.”  Mearsheimer, Can 
China Rise Peacefully?, supra note 150.     
193  Exclusion from the most vital and dynamic area of the global economy would be 
disastrous for the United States, even if it did not endanger its existence.  The situation for 
the United States would be like that in which Britain would have found itself if Napoleon’s 
“Continental System” had succeeded in shutting it out from trading with the Continent.    
194 See Feldman, supra note 61, at 38-48; 114-116. 
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not of course to forego strategic competition altogether, but to mute 
it for the sake of the larger interests of the East Asian region as a 
whole.  Nothing side would consider taking actions that would 
deeply injure or affront the other.  Rather, they would seek to 
resolve major disputes by negotiation, together with other Concert 
Powers.  While the parties would not necessarily accept limitations 
on their arms programs, they would foreswear the effort to achieve a 
clear preponderance of military power.  And all parties would have 
to explain and defend these compromises and power-sharing 
arrangements to their citizens.   
White envisages that both Japan and India would become 
members of the Concert of Asia—but not Russia (which is more a 
European than an Asian power) nor important but medium-size 
States like South Korea, Indonesia or Vietnam.  He proposes this 
requirement because a Concert system works best if its membership 
is small (which it would be with only four members) and if the 
parties to it are major powers of roughly comparable strength.  (That 
seems to mean having sufficient power to make agreements by 
some combination of other Powers unworkable.  Thus, India alone 
could probably frustrate an initiative to which China, the United 
States and Japan had agreed.)  Acting in concert, China, India, Japan 
and the United States could perhaps settle the most vexing problems 
that threaten the peace of East Asia, including North Korea’s (and 
perhaps eventually Vietnam’s) nuclearization; the future of Taiwan; 
the ownership of the South China Sea islands; and the fate of India’s 
border provinces. 
To be sure, White acknowledges that both Japan and India 
could balk at these proposals. In Japan’s case, it would mean 
abandoning its post-Second World War alliance with the United 
States,  Japan would no longer be an American client.  Instead it 
would have to rearm to a point at which it could credibly resist any 
of the other Concert Powers—including the United States—if it 
considered its demands inordinate.  Such a course would obviously 
be both expensive and worrying for Japan; it would probably entail 
major political and constitutional upheaval.  The status quo in East 
Asia since the end of the Second World War has suited Japan very 
well:  relying for its security on the United States’ military 
protection, it has been able to achieve unprecedented prosperity 
(Indeed, American administrations have sometimes considered 
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Japan to be something of a free-rider).
195
  But the post-War status 
quo is collapsing, and the realistic alternatives for Japan are not 
attractive:  either gradually becoming a strategic client of China’s, 
or relying on an increasingly undependable American alliance.  But 
for a Concert to work, Japan cannot be entirely in the American 
camp:  it must be able to sway between the United States and China.  
Problems in joining the Concert would also exist for India.  Apart 
from anything else (such as the loss of its traditional close 
relationship with Russia), India might regard the problems that beset 
East Asia as too remote from its concerns.  Longer-term, however, a 
Concert of Asia would have to include a rising power like India in 
order to remain effective.    
Could China, the United States, Japan and (eventually) India 
agree to an arrangement of this kind?  As White fully 
acknowledges, the odds are surely long.  In particular, it would be 
necessary to overcome the deep mistrust that exists between China 
and Japan.  Mindful of Japan’s attempt to conquer it in the nineteen 
thirties and forties, China might well fear remilitarization on the part 
of Japan, even if that was the price of ending the United States-
Japan alliance.  Japan would somehow have to appear to China as at 
once far more powerful and yet still unthreatening. 
China would also have to make sacrifices that it might well 
consider unacceptable.  Many Chinese political and economic 
leaders appear to think that China’s rise to regional and perhaps 
global dominance is irresistible; therefore, time is on China’s side.  
From such a perspective, it would make little sense to exchange 
future hegemony for current convenience.  Moreover, China would 
have to abandon its traditional claim to be entitled to unassailable 
pre-eminence within its region (or, indeed, within the known 
world).  Confucius is reported to have said:  “In heaven, there are 
not two suns; in a country, there are not two kings.”
196
  China would 
have to forsake its deeply-held, millennial belief that unity, not 
plurality, is the natural order of world civilization.  In the Concert’s 
heaven, there would be three (and eventually four) suns:  not only 
China’s, but those of the United States, Japan and India as well.    
But before we can reach a settled conclusion, however, it 
will be necessary to consider more deeply what a “concert” system 
                                                 
195 See Thomas J. Christensen, China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma 
in East Asia, 23 INT’L SEC. 49, 58-59 (1999). 
196 CONFUCIUS (KONG ZI), THE BOOK OF RITES (LI JI), 46 (Dai Sheng ed., James Legge 
trans., 2013). 
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is, how it differs from a balance of power system, why a Concert of 
Europe emerged and proved successful for so long in the nineteenth 
century, and whether that model could be followed in twenty-first 
century East Asia.  
 
Concert Systems vs. Balances of Power 
A “concert” system must be contrasted with a “balancing” system.  
To oversimplify radically, a “concert” system involves a balance of 
rights, not a balance of power.  Europe seems to have approximated 
most closely to a “concert” system in the period between the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars (1814/5) and the Crimean War (1853-6), 
which pitted Britain and France against Russia.  In that (roughly) 
forty year period, the great powers of Europe not only avoided 
conflict with each other, but co-operated on important occasions to 
maintain the peace and order of the Continent.  Change was indeed 
possible, with regard both to territorial boundaries and 
governmental systems; but it was brokered by the agreements of the 
concert members.  Moreover, because no State that is part of a 
“concert” system seeks to dominate the others, but rather all are 
agreed on maintaining the status quo, a “concert” system avoids the 
nervousness and jockeying that accompanies a “balancing” system.   
There are four essential differences between a “balance” and 
a “concert” system.  First, in a balance system, no Power or bloc of 
Powers forswears the right to achieve dominance over any or all of 
the others.  Each Power may properly aim at securing its own 
hegemony.  Indeed, the very idea of balancing and rebalancing 
presupposes continuing State competition for dominance.  What 
cabins power and prevents hegemony is the emergence of an 
opposing coalition of States.  There need be no common purpose to 
the coalition other than to prevent a leading Power from becoming 
ascendant.  States with widely different forms of government can 
unite into such a coalition.
197
  In concerts, States may have 
markedly different forms of government, but they share a certain 
unity of purpose that survives shifting power differentials.  
Moreover, concert Members forego opportunities to augment their 
power in relation to others.    
                                                 
197 In the Thirty Years War, Catholic France joined Protestant Sweden in fighting the 
Catholic Holy Roman Empire over Germany.  Authoritarian Russia fought alongside 
liberal Britain and France in 1914 against authoritarian Germany and Austria-Hungary.  
The liberal capitalist Anglo-American democracies banded together with Stalin’s U.S.S.R. 
in the Second World War.  
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Second, balances are often unstable (and arguably even more 
so when they are multipolar than when they are bipolar).
198
  For one 
thing, they tend to produce arms races.  Since no State has forsworn 
the objective of achieving dominance, any State in the balance may 
pursue an aggressive armaments program.  Thus, in late nineteenth 
century Europe, a rising Germany sought to create a naval force that 
would rival or outstrip that of Britain.
199
  Arms races can be fiscally 
damaging to all sides, but if one State begins an aggressive 
armaments program, other States have little choice but to compete 
up to the limits of their resources.  Under the Reagan 
Administration, the United States used its superior economic 
strength and technological advantages to pursue an arms race that, 
coupled with the collapse of the price of oil (the Soviets’ staple of 
international trade) eventually brought the Soviet Union to heel.
200
  
Concerts do not tend to provoke arms races.     
Third, balance systems may tend to produce preventive 
wars.
201
  If a State that has a military advantage over another State 
begins to see its lead slipping away, and especially if it lacks the 
resources to maintain its lead, it may yield to the temptation to strike 
at the other State while it still has the edge.  Thus Germany in 1914 
may have thought that Russia’s dramatic population growth, 
expanding economy and plans for military recovery would erode its 
                                                 
198 International relations theorists debate whether bipolar or multipolar systems are the 
more stable.  For the view that multipolar systems provide less permissive conditions for 
major war, see Dale C. Copeland, Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Stability, 5 
SECURITY STUD. 29 (1996).  For the view that bipolar systems are more stable, see Kenneth 
Waltz, The Stability of a Bipolar World, 93 Daedalus 881 (1964).  And some contend that 
neither bipolarity nor multi-polarity is highly relevant to stability, see Ted Hopf, Polarity, 
the Offense-Defense Balance, and War, 85 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 475 (1991).    
199 See, e.g., John H. Maurer, Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race before 
World War I: Lessons for Today?, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 285 (1997). 
200 Reagan’s defense build-up raised United States defense spending from $134 billion in 
1980 to $253 billion in 1989. By the end, American defense spending reached 7 % of GDP. 
Those increases arguably compelled the Soviet Union in the 1980s to raise the share of its 
defense spending from 22 % to 27 % of GDP, while freezing the production of civilian 
goods at 1980 levels.  See Ronald Hilton, The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Ronald 
Reagan (n.d.), available at http://wais.stanford.edu/History/history_ussrandreagan.htm.  
For the counter-argument that the United States arms build-up did not hasten the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, see Fred Chernoff, Ending the Cold War:  The Soviet Retreat and the 
US Military Buildup, 67 INT’L AFF. (Royal Institute of Int’l Aff. 1944-) 111 (1991).   
201 Indeed, some balance of power theorists explicitly approve preventive war, if only to 
restore or maintain a disturbed equilibrium.  Thus in his essay Of Empire, Lord Bacon 
wrote:  “There is no question but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no 
blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.”  Quoted in Per Maurseth, Balance-of-Power 
Thinking from the Renaissance to the French Revolution, 1 J. PEACE RESEARCH 120, 121 
(1964).    
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lead over Russia in ground forces.  In that situation, Germany was 
surely tempted to strike at Russia before it lost the advantage.
202
  
But in concerts, there is no such built-in tendency for preventive 
wars to occur. 
Finally, in a balance system, the very existence of every 
State is constantly at risk.  Although the complete disappearance of 
a large or medium-sized State is highly unusual (eighteenth century 
Poland is a rare instance), no State can rest certain that it will not be 
destroyed or dismembered if defeated in war.  (Thus Germany in 
1945, though not destroyed as a State, was partitioned into two 
antagonistic States, East and West Germany; and in 1919, though 
not partitioned, Germany suffered a substantial loss of population 
and territory.)  Opposing States in a balance system do not need to 
recognize each other’s legitimacy: they are free to discredit or 
subvert each other’s governments, poison the loyalty of their 
populations, or wage continuing propaganda and diplomatic 
offenses against them.  In concerts, major powers recognize the 
others’ legitimacy, respect the others’ boundaries and do not seek to 
destabilize the others’ governments.   
As I have suggested, Asia seems to be moving in the 
direction of a balance of power system, arraying China and 
(perhaps) Russia on the one side and the United States, Japan, some 
smaller Pacific powers and (perhaps) India on the other.  While a 
balancing system might indeed preserve the peace and stability of 
East Asia, the situation would be fraught, much as the bipolar Cold 
War balance was.  Moreover, without arms control agreements, the 
system would tend to produce arms races.  And because there are 
many flashpoints in East Asia—North Korea, Taiwan, and the South 
                                                 
202 On the question whether the First World War was a preventive war on Germany’s part, 
see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., July 1914 revisited and revised, in THE OUTBREAK OF THE 
FIRST WORLD WAR: STRUCTURE, POLITICS, AND DECISION-MAKING 30 (Jack S. Levy & 
John A. Vasquez ed., 2014); Dale Copeland, International relations theory and the three 
great puzzles of the First World War, in id., 167.  In THE RUSSIAN ORIGINS OF THE FIRST 
WORLD War (2011), Sean McMeeken agrees that the war was preventive, but argues that 
the blame for it must be shared between Germany and Russia.  On McMeeken’s account, 
the question of Constantinople and the Dardanelles Strait was of overriding strategic 
importance to Russia, and Russia brought the war on in order to prevent the looming 
Ottoman naval build-up in the Black Sea.  See id. at 29-40.  “It is high time that Russia . . . 
receive its fair share of scrutiny for its role in unleashing the terrible European war of 
1914 . . . Neither a deliberate German plot nor an avoidable accident, the First World War 
was the inexorable culmination of a burgeoning imperial rivalry between Wilhelmine 
Germany and tsarist Russia in the Near East, each lured in its own way down the 
dangerous path of expansionist war by the decline of Ottoman power.”  Id. at 243.   
McMeeken’s analysis is challenged in Lieven, supra note 123, at 337-342. 
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China Sea Islands to name but a few—the system would be highly 
war-prone.  Given the undesirability of that outcome, could we—
despite the difficulties already noted—move towards a “concert” 
system instead? 
 
The Concert of Europe 
Let us consider in closer detail the “Concert of Europe” that 
provides the historical model for White’s proposed “Concert of 
Asia.” 
The Concert of Europe was created at the Peace Conference 
at Vienna in 1815, after the defeat of Napoleonic France.
203
  Europe 
had been plunged into general war for almost a quarter century 
before, from the start of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1792 
through the Napoleonic Wars that ended at Waterloo in 1815.  The 
Powers, great and small, assembled for the peace conference had 
two overriding objectives.  First, they wanted an end to any further 
wars or revolutions in the European State system.  In effect, they 
wanted a “restoration” of the pattern of monarchic rule, or the 
ançien régime, under which nearly all of continental Europe had 
been governed before the outbreak of the French Revolution in 
1789.
204
  But second, they also wanted to avoid returning to the 
“balance of power” system that had prevailed in their international 
relations before 1789.
205
  They considered that the “balance” system 
was too prone to war—that it encouraged, not merely competitive, 
but also predatory, practices among States.  Of these instances, the 
most conspicuous was the progressive partition of the independent 
State of Poland by its more powerful neighbors, Prussia, Austria and 
Russia, which had eventually wiped Poland off the map.  The 
Concert of Europe system was the result.  It was, in the estimation 
of some historians, as well as in that of the participants themselves, 
                                                 
203  A classic study of the Conference is HENRY KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED:  
METTERNICH, CASTLEREAGH, AND THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE, 1812-1822 (1973).  See also 
CHARLES F. DORAN, THE POLITICS OF ASSIMILATION:  HEGEMONY AND ITS AFTERMATH, 
147-88 (1971). 
204 See James Joll, The Ideal and the Real:  Changing Concepts of the International System, 
1815-1982, 58 INT’L AFF. 210, 211 (1982).   
205 For a survey of the scholarly findings that the eighteenth century European balance of 
power was predatory and war-prone, see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Kant, 
Habermas, and Democratic Peace, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 437, 442-443 (2009). 
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a novel international system, and a brilliant triumph of skillful 
diplomacy.
206
   
The Concert of Europe that emerged from the Vienna Peace 
Conference was founded on the ideas of legality, legitimacy and 
right, rather than primarily on that of power.  Henry Kissinger 
writes: 
Paradoxically, this international order, which was 
created more explicitly in the name of the balance of 
power than any other before or since, relied the least 
on power to maintain itself.  This unique state of 
affairs occurred partly because the equilibrium was 
designed so well that it could only be overthrown by 
an effort of magnitude too difficult to mount.  But 
the most important reason was that the Continental 
countries were knit together by a sense of shared 
values.  There was not only a physical equilibrium, 
but a moral one.  Power and justice were in 
substantial harmony.  The balance of power reduces 
the opportunities for using force; a shared sense of 




Leaders of the successful coalition that had defeated 
Napoleonic France understood that while they had won a 
resounding victory, they had still to make a peace, and that for that 
peace to be durable, it had to be fair to all, including France.  
Shortly after the final defeat of Napoleon, Prussian General August 
Rühle von Lilienstern explained the vital differences between 
“victory” and “peace”: 
 
Victory . . . is not always the necessary condition of 
conquest or of peace, and peace is not always the 
necessary result of victory and conquest . . .  Victory 
and conquest are often causes of the continuation, 
the renewal and multiplication of war . . . [O]ne 
only wages war for [the sake of] peace, and . . . one 
should only wage war, in order afterwards to build it 
                                                 
206 See, e.g., DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, UNION, NATION, OR EMPIRE:  THE AMERICAN DEBATE 
OVER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1789-1941 at 75 (2009) (describing the Concert as “an 
inspired example of cooperation among states. . . a cooperative effort that was 
unprecedented, from which useful lessons may still be learned”). 
207 HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 79 (1994). 
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Rühle’s observations reflect a return to the traditional European 
understanding—ruptured by Napoleon—that the object of war can 
only be peace, and that a peace can be lasting only if it is accepted 
as just.
209
   
How did the Concert system work? 
Each Great Power in the concert—Britain, Prussia, Austria, 
Russia and, eventually, France accepted the existence of the other, 
regardless of the differences in the forms of government under 
which they lived.  (Britain and, later, France were constitutional 
monarchies; Russia, Prussia and Austria were absolutist.)  Further, 
three of the Powers—Russia, Prussia and Austria—formed a 
distinct sub-system, the “Holy Alliance,” that supported absolutism 
within each of its three members and promised to intervene in other 
monarchical States to prevent revolutions.  Members of the Concert 
did not pursue competitive advantages over one another if such 
pursuits would have endangered their solidarity or tended to breed 
discontent:  thus, the Vienna Peace Conference not only restored 
defeated France to its pre-war boundaries, but even enlarged them, 
in order to ensure that an aggrieved France would not return to war.  
Such concessions to international solidarity would, however, have 
cut against the balancing scheme, in which each State seeks to 
weaken or destroy potential rivals.      
Because each State accepted or even guaranteed the 
existence of each other and forswore designs on each other’s 
territory or population, States could breathe easier.  The anxieties 
and suspicions that lead to arms races were abated.  Disputes 
between two or more Concert members tended to be resolved at 
periodic diplomatic conferences of all the Concert members, rather 
than by bilateral use of force.  Despite significant disagreements 
over the merits of different forms of government, no Concert 
member attempted to provoke revolution, stimulate dissent or 
otherwise seek to destabilize in any of the others.  The two militarily 
dominant members of the Concert—Britain and Russia—did not use 
                                                 
208 Quoted in Beatrice Heuser, Victory, Peace, and Justice:  The Neglected Trinity, 69 
JOINT FORCES Q. 6, 8 (2013).   
209 For that interpretation, see Heuser, supra note 204, at 8 (discussing the object of war 
during the Napoleonic Wars). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
62 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW    Vol. 11 
 
their superior strength to weaken or overawe the weaker members—
France, Prussia and Austria. 
The Concert of Europe lasted for about a generation from 
1815 until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 which pitted 
two Concert powers (Britain and France) against a third (Russia).  
Fundamentally, the Crimean War arose out of the emerging risk of 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire—not itself considered a 
“European” State,
210
 but one so closely abutting on Europe that its 
fate was a matter of general European concern.  Russia was seeking 
to aggrandize itself at the expense of the declining Ottomans; 
Britain and France feared that such aggrandizement would threaten 
their vital interests outside Europe.   
As international security régimes go, the Concert system was 
a remarkable success.  It prevented major war in Europe for nearly 
forty years; and when such a war broke it, it was over lands that 
were located on Europe’s periphery.  And it did more than merely 
prevent Great Power war; rather, it helped to produce many other 
significant international public goods.
211
   
                                                 
210 The Ottoman Empire was formally admitted into the European States system only in 
1856, under Article VII of the Treaty of Paris that ended the Crimean War.  In that clause, 
the major European States “declare the Sublime Porte [i.e., the Ottoman Empire] admitted 
to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe.” See 
generally Gerrit Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1984). 
211 Historian Paul Schroeder writes: 
 
The most impressive aspect of post-1815 European politics is not 
simply the virtual absence of war.  More notable is an array of 
positive results achieved in international politics in this era, of 
problems settled and dangers averted by diplomacy.  . . . [A]short list 
of the accomplishments would have to include the following:  the 
speedy evacuation of Allied armies from France and France’s quick 
reintegration into the European Concert; the completion and 
implementation of the federal constitution of Germany; the 
suppression of revolutions in Naples, Piedmont, Spain, and the 
Danubian Principalities by international action, without serious 
European quarrels; the recognition of Latin American independence; 
the prevention of war between Russia and Turkey for seven years 
(1821 to 1828), and a moderate end to that war after it did break out; 
the creation of an independent Greece; the prompt recognition of a 
new government in France after the revolution of 1830; the creation 
of an independent, neutralized Belgium. . . ; the prevention of 
international conflict in 1830-1832 over revolts in Italy, Germany, 
and Poland; the managing of civil wars in Spain and Portugal without 
great-power conflict; and two successful joint European rescue 
operations for the Ottoman Empire. 
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 Several historically specific circumstances undoubtedly 
contributed to the Concert’s success.  After almost a quarter century 
of war and revolution, Europe was exhausted by both.  European 
States demanded a respite—more, a long recovery—from those 
conditions.  They were therefore strongly disposed to cooperate 
with one another in restoring and maintaining stability.  Moreover, 
most European ruling dynasties feared for their survival after the 
French Revolution; even England, the least revolution-prone 
member of the Concert, witnessed serious internal disturbances 
during the Concert’s life span.
212
  Hence, European governments 
were unusually ready to cooperate with and make concessions to 
one another for the sake of maintaining peace.  The fear of a 
recurrence of a revolution in France and the ensuing outbreak of 
another great war against that Power augmented the general desire 
to cooperate.  Further, such inter-state competition as there was 
largely shifted into the non-European world:  Russia sought to 
extend its Empire east into Asia and south into the Middle East; 
Britain pursued its imperial projects in Asia; France expanded into 
North Africa; Prussia and Austria were generally content to remain 
continental powers only.  Finally and most importantly, a significant 
change in consciousness seems also to have occurred:  European 
statesmen and diplomats began thinking and acting in terms of the 
interests of Europe as a collectivity, as against thinking only in 
terms of the national interests of their several States.  
This last point is critical.  The consciousness of a common 
European fate arose, not only from the shared experience of a 
generation of war and the heady excitement of a decisive military 
victory, but also from the very circumstances in which the end of 
the long war and the peace conference took place.  During the last 
two years of the war, and even more during the Congress of Vienna, 
“the sovereigns and leading diplomats of the Allied countries had 
become accustomed to very close co-operation.  They travelled 
together for hundreds of miles, they often stayed together in small 
inns, they saw each other almost every day . . .  [T]hey seem to have 
begun to appreciate each other’s interests and to share each other’s 
apprehensions  . . .  [T]hey grew accustomed to dealing with foreign 
affairs in much the same way as they were used to tackle internal 
                                                                                                               
Paul Schroeder, 19TH-Century International System: Changes in the Structure, 36 WORLD 
POLITICS  1, 3 (1986). 
212  The “Peterloo Massacre” of 1819 is one such incident.  See E.P. THOMPSON, THE 
MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 669-699 (1966). 
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affairs: that is to say, they held discussion with a handful of people 
who mattered, and followed them up by concerted action.”213  And 
they became aware that the international system they were creating 
was a novelty – in fact, a stunning diplomatic breakthrough.  The 
British Foreign Minister Viscount Castlereagh wrote in 1818 that 
the Concert: 
 
really appears to me to be a new discovery in the 
European Government, at once extinguishing the 
cobwebs with which diplomacy obscures the 
horizon, bringing the whole bearing of the system 
into its true light, and giving to the great Powers the 
efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single 
State.214  
 
And in a report of March 1818, the Austrian statesman Friedrich 
von Gentz, who had been the secretary to the Congress of Vienna, 
wrote that “the political system that is established in Europe since 
1814 and 1815 is a phenomenon unheard of in the history of the 
world.”215 
The sense of belonging to a European “family” or society of 
states that stood over and above individual states and that had 
distinct claims of its own persisted for decades after the Congress of 
Vienna.  Ten years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the 
Prussian statesman Friedrich Ancillon, described the Concert of 
Europe in this way: 
 
The five great powers, closely united among 
themselves and with the others, form a system of 
solidarity, by which one stands for all and all for 
one; in which power appears only as protection for 
everybody’s possessions and rights; in which the 
maintenance of the whole and the parts within legal 
                                                 
213
 H.G. SCHENK, THE AFTERMATH OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS:  THE CONCERT OF EUROPE – 
AN EXPERIMENT 125 (1947).   
214 Id. at 126. 
215 CARSTEN HOLBRAAD, THE CONCERT OF EUROPE:  A STUDY IN GERMAN AND BRITISH 
INTERNATIONAL THEORY 1813-1914, at 17 (1970).  Gentz went on to contrast the Concert 
system, “a principle of general union, reuniting the entirety of States through a federative 
tie, under the direction of five principal Powers,” with the balance of power, a principle 
that had “only too often troubled and bloodied Europe through three centuries.”  As a result 
of the Concert, he claimed, Europe had become “a great political family.”  Id.    
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bounds, for the sake of the peace of the world, has 
become the only aim of political activity; in which 
one deals openly, deliberates over everything 
collectively and acts jointly.216 
 
 This view of the Concert remained widely shared.  The 
States assembled in the London Conference of 1831 could 
themselves declare: “Chaque Nation a ses droits particuliers; mais 
l’Europe aussi a son droit; c’est l’ordre social qui le lui a donné.”217   
But the emergence of such a common consciousness is 
unlikely; its continued existence is fragile; and its disappearance 
tends to lead to a return to a balance of power system.  That, indeed, 
is what happened in Europe after the breakdown of the European 
Concert in the Crimean War.   
 
The Concerts of Europe and Asia Compared 
The success and longevity of the Concert of Europe 
depended on a change in the consciousness of Europe’s Great 
Powers:  their leaders and diplomats came to think of, and defer to, 
the interests of Europe as a whole, rather than merely consulting 
their own national interests (as in a balancing system).  The 
circumstances existing in Europe after the fall of Napoleon were 
exceptionally favorable to that development.  In particular, the long 
war of the European Powers against France, which extended from 
1792 to 1815, induced a sense of solidarity and a willingness to 
cooperate among the allied Powers that seem to have endured well 
beyond their victory.  Some analysts therefore have argued that a 
“concert” system is only attainable in the wake of a major war.  
Thus, Robert Jervis has noted that the Concert of Europe 
“was characterized by an unusually high and self-conscious level of 
cooperation among the major European powers.  They did not play 
the game as hard as they could; they did not take advantage of 
others’ short-term vulnerabilities . . . Multilateral and self-restrained 
                                                 
216 HOLBRAAD, supra note 215, at 37. 
217 Martin Wight, Why is there no International Theory?, 17 DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS 
35, 46 (Martin Wight & Herbert Butterfield eds., 1966) (“Each Nation has its particular 
rights; but Europe also has its own right, and it is the social order that has given it to it.”).  
One should also note that the idea of Europe as in some way composing a single unitary 
commonwealth, which ideally ought to be directed “towards a community of power rather 
than towards a balance of power,” had had distinguished intellectual forebears, including 
Archbishop Fénelon, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.  Maurseth, supra note 
201, at 128-30.   
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methods of handling their problems were preferred to the more 
common unilateral and less restrained methods.”218  What made this 
unusual outcome possible?  For Jervis, the explanation lies in the 
long war the allies had fought against France’s drive for supremacy: 
 
Concert systems form after, and only after, a large 
war against a potential hegemon because such a 
conflict alters the . . . assumptions [that States need 
to be able to ally freely if non-permanently with one 
another and that war is a legitimate tool of 
statecraft] and increases the incentives to 
cooperate . . . First, [counter-hegemonic war] leads 
to unusually close bonds among the states of the 
counter-hegemonic coalition, even though disputes 
and hostility within the coalition never disappear.  It 
is hard to form such a coalition in the first place, and 
even the shared experience of fighting a winning 
war does not remove all sources of friction.  But it 
does tend to produce significant ties among allies . . . 
[Second] is the belief that the defeated hegemon is 
not a normal state.  Under the balance of power, all 
states are potentially fit alliance partners; none is 
seen as much more evil than any other.  But a war 
against a potential hegemon alters this belief.  
France after the Napoleonic wars and Germany after 
the two World Wars were not seen as similar to 
other states.  Instead, they were thought to be 
ineradicably aggressive . . .  Thus, even though the 
victors may reintegrate the losing state into the 
international system – as the powers did after the 
Napoleonic wars – a significant part of the purpose 
of doing so is to continue to restrain it.219  
 
Jervis’s analysis seems to be correct.  In most circumstances, 
major States will have little interest in cooperating with one another 
when cooperation entails significant harm to their national interests.  
And they will often tend to balance against one another in order to 
                                                 
218 Robert Jervis, From Balance to Concert: A Study in International Security Cooperation, 
38 WORLD POLITICS 58, 59 (1985).  
219 Id. at 60-61. 
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prevent any one State from becoming excessively powerful.  The 
chances of extensive and durable cooperation are much improved, 
however, when the States in question have gone through a 
protracted but victorious war in alliance with one another against a 
State seeking supremacy, and remain fearful even after that victory 
that the defeated State will make another attempt.  The memory of 
the war infuses the victors with the spirit of cooperation that creates 
the concert; the continuing fear that the defeated enemy may rise 
again keeps the concert alive.220  In such conditions, but not in others, 
a concert system may emerge.  Plainly, these conditions are not met 
for the members of the prospective Concert of Asia. 
 
The “Concert” of North America 
Confirming this analysis is the case of the United States 
itself.  The original union of the American States can be seen as a 
highly intensified “concert”—the Concert of North America.221  The 
union was forged in the Revolutionary War, and was consolidated 
by the Constitution of 1787.  The memory of the shared experience 
of war and victory encouraged the deeper and more integrated union 
that the Constitution was intended to create.  In The Federalist No. 
2, John Jay invoked the recollection of wartime solidarity, urging 
the American States and people to form a closer union because “by 
their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side 
throughout a long and bloody war, [they] have nobly established 
general liberty and independence.”222 David Ramsay’s History of the 
American Revolution, first published in 1789, also affirmed that 
through the experience of the Revolutionary War, especially in the 
Continental Army, “a foundation was laid for the establishment of a 
nation, out of discordant materials.”223  The specter of the return of 
British domination—which became a real threat in the War of 
1812—helped cement the Union in this early phase.  But the British 
                                                 
220 See id. at 65-67 (discussing fear of a recurrence of revolution in France and the ensuing 
risk of another counter-hegemonic war against it); see also ERIC HOBSBAWM, ECHOES OF 
THE MARSEILLAISE:  TWO CENTURIES LOOK BACK AT THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 4-5 (1990) 
(positing that the French Revolution was widely perceived throughout nineteenth century 
as marking a decisive turning-point in history).  
221 See HENDRICKSON, supra note 202 (discussing the (original) American Union as a form 
of heightened international cooperation).  
222 THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 6 (John Jay). 
223 DAVID RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 316 (2d ed. 1990). 
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threat receded after the War’s end in 1815. 224   As the Founding 
generation died off, memories of the Revolutionary War faded and 
fears of Britain threat waned, the American Concert began to 
unravel.  The lifespan of the early concert was about a generation.  
By 1820, the Missouri crisis raised the possibility that the Union 
would dissolve in sectional conflict.225  It was restabilized for nearly 
another generation (until 1850) by the Missouri Compromise of 
1820, which can be seen as a kind of balance of power arrangement.  
Under the Compromise, the South in effect received a guarantee of 
sectional equilibrium in the Senate, to be maintained thenceforward 
by admitting slave and free States in pairs.   
Reviewing the situation in 1850, Florida Congressman 
David Yulee defended “the settled policy to preserve, as nearly as 
possible, in one of the branches of the Legislature of the Union, that 
balance of power between two of the great divisions of the republic, 
which is so important to the harmony and security of the whole, and 
to the permanency of the Union.”226  And as the Senate voted for the 
admission of California in 1850 – which upset the sectional 
equilibrium in that body—Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davies 
objected that “we are about permanently to destroy the balance of 
power between the sections of the Union, by securing a majority to 
one, in both Houses of Congress . . . when those who are to have the 
control in both Houses of Congress will also have the Executive 
power in their hands.”227  Ten years later, when a Northern-based 
anti-slavery party did indeed assume control of the Executive 
branch, the South concluded that the balance of power within the 
Union had swung decisively and permanently against it; and the 
Civil War ensued.   
The history of the Concert of North America roughly 
parallels that of the Concert of Europe.  It arose out of the 
experience of a long and difficult war that forged a common sense 
of purpose and the makings of a collective identity from different 
but allied States and peoples.  It was held together by the fear of the 
                                                 
224 See ALAN TAYLOR, THE CIVIL WAR OF 1812:  AMERICAN CITIZENS, BRITISH SUBJECTS, 
IRISH REBELS, & INDIAN ALLIES 437-39 (2011). 
225  On the Missouri Compromise, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SECTIONAL CRISIS AND 
SOUTHERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 9-23 (1995) (noting that the end of the War of 1812, 
together with the advent of a general peace in Europe, helped to precipitate “the first 
sectional crisis over slavery”).  
226 JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY 1789-1861:  A STUDY IN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 106 (1963). 
227 Id. at 109. 
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return of the defeated but still powerful foe.  And it lasted for about 
a generation, or until the geopolitical threat posed by that foe abated.  
As before, these conditions are not met in East Asia.   
 
V. “Conflict prevention” as an alternative to a “Concert”? 
Perhaps a more modest project than a fully-fledged Concert 
of Asia might be feasible; certainly the idea may be worth 
consideration.  The project in question could conceivably serve as a 
confidence-building measure, and so lead to further and deeper co-
operation between the Great Powers of East Asia.  In a nutshell, 
rather than a attempting to create a “Concert,” the Great Powers 
should gradually institute a series of measures for “conflict 
prevention.”228   
As we have seen, China has in recent years been asserting 
increasingly bold claims over the South China Sea, and taking 
forcible measures to back up those claims.  Based more on history 
than on current international law, China now claims ownership over 
about 80% of those waters.  About 40% to 50% of the world’s 
trade—and most of China’s imported oil supply—traverses these 
waters.  They are obviously of the highest strategic sensitivity, not 
only to China, but to nations like Japan and South Korea.229  One 
writer summarizes: 
Oil heading east fuels the giant economies at the 
other end of the South China Sea:  Taiwan, South 
Korea, China and Japan.  To the west there flows 
the combined output of the workshops of the world:  
hardware and software, headwear and footwear. The 
best guess suggest that more than half the world’s 
maritime trade goes through the Straits of Malacca, 
                                                 
228 “Conflict prevention” can of course take many forms, but here it refers primarily to a 
deepening process of agreements through which States that were initially rivals or even 
outright enemies come to adjust their differences and learn to co-operate with one other.  
The Anglo-French agreements that led to the entente cordiale of 1904 is a good example. 
Britain and France had historically been enemies and, in the late nineteenth century, 
remained rivals for dominance in much of Africa.  Their rivalry even threatened to lead to 
war.  Gradually, however, the two States made agreements that reduced the tensions 
between them and, in time, led to a warm relationship.  For a study of the background, see 
Christopher Andrew, France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale, 10 Hist. J. 89 (1967).     
229 See Alexander L. Vuving, Vietnam, the US, and Japan in the South China Sea,  THE 
DIPLOMAT, Nov. 26, 2014, available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/vietnam-the-us-
and-japan-in-the-south-china-sea/ (“besides its economic value, the SCS also has an 
enormous strategic value for several countries and an increasing symbolic value for some 
of the disputants.”).  
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along with half the world’s liquefied natural gas and 
one-third of its crude oil.  If the ships stopped 
moving, it wouldn’t be long before the lights in 
some parts of the world started going out. 
The South China Sea is both the fulcrum of world 
trade and a crucible of conflict.  There were battles 
in 1974 and 1988 and there have been dozens of less 
violent confrontations since.  The United States has 
been involved since the beginning and India has 
begun to take an interest.230   
 
China’s pursuit of its claims have increasingly provoked 
incidents with its weaker neighbors in that region, including 
Vietnam and the Philippines.  Both of the latter nations have been 
developing their coastal and other military forces in the hopes of 
deterring further Chinese encroachments on what they see as their 
own valid claims. Of late, the disputes appear to be intensifying, and 
include the risk of armed clashes between United States Navy 
vessels operating in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone and naval 
Chinese forces.231 
The proposal is, in essence, that the South China Sea be 
demilitarized (or more precisely, de-navalized).232  Most of it should 
                                                 
230 Hayton, supra note 94, at xvi. 
231 See Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea Contingency Planning 
Memorandum, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS Apr. 2012, available at 
http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883; Recent Trends in the South 
China Sea Disputes, BOSTON GLOBAL FORUM, June 2015,  available at 
http://bostonglobalforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Recent-Trends-changes-in-the-South-
China-Sea-Disputes.pdf.   
232 Recently, at a US-China Summit meeting in Washington, DC, President Xi announced 
that China would not “militarize” the artificial islands it has been building in the South 
China Sea.  Although the extent of this commitment is uncertain, it is a welcome step in the 
direction recommended by this paper.  See Carole E. Lee, Colleen McCain Nelson & 
Jeremy Page, U.S.-China Summit Yields Tentative Deals, in The Wall Street Journal at A6 
(Sept. 26/7, 2015).  
  
Previously, the ASEAN nations and China had agreed to a non-binding political 
“Declaration of Conduct” relating to the South China Sea, the 2002 Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, available at 
http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-
parties-in-the-south-china-sea.  This Declaration is – at best – “soft law,” and some nations, 
including the US, wish to see it replaced by a “Code of Conduct” of greater legal effect.  
See The White House National Security Strategy 13 (February 2015) (supporting “the early 
conclusion of an effective code of conduct for the South China Sea between China and 
[ASEAN],” available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
2015_national_security_strategy.pdf; Le Hong Hiep, Law and the South China Sea, in The 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/2
2015]   TOWARDS A CONCERT OF ASIA                71 
 
be declared off-limits to the navies (and perhaps also the coastal 
forces) of any of the regional powers, including the United States, 
China and Japan.  The core idea, plainly, is to defuse the growing 
tensions in Southeast Asia that arise from the disputes over these 
islands.  The hope is that, if successful, the demilitarization of the 
South China Sea could lead in time to closer and more extensive co-
operation between the United States, China and Japan on other 
matters of vital interest to them all.  If the initial collaboration 
worked, later actions could be modeled on it—for instance, the 
demilitarization of the East China Sea and the waters surrounding 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  And if that later step worked, the three 
leading nations might then seek to move forward to the 
demilitarization, neutralization and unification of the Korean 
peninsula.233  Gradually, the most acute points of conflict between 
them could be reduced.  Something like a “Concert” of Asia might 
eventually begin to emerge.   
There are precedents for the complete or partial 
demilitarization of strategically sensitive areas.234  These have often 
included maritime areas, even extensive ones.  Under Article XI of 
the Treaty of Paris (1856),235 concluding the Crimean War, the Black 
                                                                                                               
Diplomat (July 19, 2011), available at http://thediplomat.com/2011/07/law-and-the-south-
china-sea/.  The proposal offered here would take the current Declaration of Conduct to an 
altogether higher level.  
233  For a different plan for the reunification of Korea, see Gregory Macris, China on 
Korean Reunification:  Spoiler, Beneficiary, or Something in Between?, available at 
https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=156.   
234 At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Great Powers used both demilitarization and 
“neutralization” (which is akin to demilitarization) as conflict prevention devices.  See 
Alice Ackermann, The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention, 40 J. Peace Res. 339, 340 
(2003); Louise Richardson, The Concert of Europe and Security Management in the 
Nineteenth Century, in IMPERFECT UNIONS:  SECURITY INSTITUTIONS OVER TIME AND SPACE 
52 (Helga Haftendorn, et al. eds., 1999); Malbone W. Graham, Neutralization as a 
Movement in International Law, 21 AM. J. INT’L L. 79, 82 (1927).  Thus, the Treaty of 
Paris of November 20, 1815 prohibited fortifications in the town of Hüningen in Alsace.  
See 4 RUDOLF BERNHARDT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:  USE OF FORCE 
– WAR AND NEUTRALITY PEACE TREATIES N-Z 32 (1982).  For numerous other cases, see 3 
J.H. W. VERZILJ, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 500-12 (1970); 
Friedrich Kratochwil, Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the 
Formation of the State System, 39 WORLD POLITICS 27, 40-41 (1986). 
235 Treaty of Paris art. XI, 1856 (“ARTICLE XI. The Black Sea is Neutralised; its Waters 
and its Ports, thrown open to the Mercantile Marine of every Nation, are formally and in 
perpetuity interdicted to the Flag of War, either of the Powers possessing its Coasts, or of 
any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles XIV and XIX of the present 
Treaty”). There were minor exceptions to this general rule.   
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Sea was demilitarized. 236   The Rush-Bagot Treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain, concluded after the War of 1812, 
substantially demilitarized the Great Lakes of British and American 
warships. 237   In 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution calling for the Indian Ocean to be declared a “zone of 
peace.”238  Later, in 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, in an 
address to the Indian Parliament, supported a proposal to 
demilitarize the Indian Ocean.239 
Land masses too have been demilitarized.  The Egypt-Israel 
Peace Treaty (1979)240 limits the forces Egypt can station on the 
Sinai Peninsula.  Article 1 of the Antarctica Treaty of 1959 
demilitarizes that continent. 241   The Versailles Treaty 242  and the 
Locarno Treaty243 provided for the demilitarization of the Rhineland.  
Article 13 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty244 provided for the partial 
demilitarization of certain Greek islands.  Article 9 of the Svalbard 
Treaty (1920) 245  commits Norway to the demilitarization of the 
Archipelago of Spitsbergen.  In Request for Interpretation of the 
Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple for 
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), the International Court of 
Justice ordered the creation of a “provisional demilitarized zone” 
                                                 
236 Russia announced in 1870 that it would no longer observe the Treaty’s requirements 
with regard to the Black Sea.  See PHILIP TOWLE, ENFORCED DISARMAMENT:  FROM THE 
NAPOLEON CAMPAIGNS TO THE GULF WAR 51-65 (1997). 
237 The treaty originally took the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes, but was later 
ratified by the US Senate.  For the text, see Richard Rush & Charles Bagot, British-
American Diplomacy Exchange of Notes Relative to Naval Forces on the American Lakes 
(1817), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/conv1817.asp.  
238 See UN General Assembly Resolution on Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace, 11 Int’l Leg. 
Materials 217 (1972).  
239  See Steve Goldstein, Gorbachev Endorses Demilitarizing Indian Ocean, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Nov. 28, 1986, available at http://articles.philly.com/1986-11-
28/news/26091452_1_indo-soviet-relations-nuclear-free-world-mikhail-s-gorbachev.   
240 Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Isr.-Egypt, Mar. 26, 1979, 1138 U.N.T.S. 71, 
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201138/volume-1138-
I-17855-English.pdf.  
241  The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 159, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, available at 
http://www.ats.aq/documents/ats/treaty_original.pdf  
242 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and Protocol 
[Treaty of Versailles], Arts. 42, 43, June 28, 1919, A.T.S. 1. 
243 Locarno Treaty, Arts. 1 and 2, Sep. 14, 1926, 54 L.N.T.S. 290. 
244 Treaty of Lausanne, July 23, 1923, U.K.T.S. 16, available at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/ 
index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne  
245  Svalbard Treaty, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8, available at 
http://emeritus.lovdata.no/traktater/texte/tre-19200209-001.html#map009  
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around a Temple whose ownership is claimed by both Cambodia 
and Thailand.246   
The proposed naval demilitarization would not have to be 
absolute.  For one thing, the South China Sea has a long history of 
infestation by pirates. 247   Were it to be absolutely demilitarized, 
piracy would be sure to return.  The obvious answer, however, is 
that demilitarization need not be complete.  An international naval 
task force composed of warships from the United States, Chinese 
and Japanese Navy, under the rotating command of American, 
Chinese and Japanese Admirals, could be assigned responsibility for 
policing the waters and preventing pirate attacks.248  Furthermore, it 
might also be necessary for warships to enter the demilitarized zone 
in order to provide humanitarian relief in the event of a natural or 
other catastrophe (The United States Navy was used to bring relief 
to the endangered population of Fukushima in Japan after the 
nuclear accident there in 2011). Warships of coastal powers would 
have to be permitted to enter the demilitarized in “hot pursuit” of 
criminal vessels breaking past the territorial waters of the pursuing 
authority.  Any demilitarization agreement would have to provide 
for these and other such contingencies.   
Demilitarization would not, of course, be a comprehensive 
solution to the problems at issue between China and its southern 
neighbors.  There is an economic dimension, as well as a security 
dimension, to China’s interest in the South China Sea.  Still 
outstanding would be the question of the ownership of the seabed 
resources linked to possession of the disputed islands or other 
maritime features in the South China Sea—though these appear to 
be much less valuable than China has believed. 249   While 
demilitarization could relieve tension over the movement of 
shipping across the South China Sea, it would not address the 
                                                 
246 2011 ICJ Rep. 537, 552 at ¶ 61. 
247 See Malaysia v. Singapore at ¶ 57; Jonathan De Hart, Pirates of the Southeast Seas, THE 
DIPLOMAT, July 23, 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/pirates-of-the-
southeast-asian-seas/.   
248 Since 2008, the Chinese Navy has taken part in multinational antipiracy operations in 
the Gulf of Aden.  See Andrew S. Erickson & Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for 
Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden, 10 CHINA MARITIME 
STUDIES 9, 46-50 (2013), available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-
Maritime-Studies-Institute/Publications/documents/CMS10_Web_2.aspx.  (For the debates 
among Chinese legal experts over the issues that China’s participation involves, see id. at 
46-50, 70-72.)  This existing practice could serve as a model for collaborative antipiracy 
operations in the South China Sea.   
249 See Hayton, supra note 94, at 147-49. But see Kaplan, supra note 114, at 10. 
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ownership of the natural resources in and below the waters.  To the 
extent that the disputes between China and its neighbors arise out of 
rival claims to the resources of the seabed in those waters, it would, 
therefore, also be necessary to compromise and adjust those claims 
and to develop reasonable rules for apportioning the resources at 
stake.  That could not be done by a consortium of the United States, 
China and Japan alone.  Still, those three nations could use their 
influence to shape a more definitive settlement of the issues.  One 
possibility that might be explored would be a multilateral agreement 
to place the disputed areas under international control as a maritime 
preserve and share out the resources.250 
There is also a substantial legal problem for the 
demilitarization proposal.  Even if the United States, China and 
Japan agreed to refrain from sending warships into the demilitarized 
zone for other purposes, other naval powers would retain the right 
under international law to send or station their own warships there.  
A United States-China-Japan Agreement could not legally bar the 
Australian, Indian or Russian Navies, say, from entering the South 
China Sea in full force.  The United States Navy has been 
particularly insistent that its warships have the right under 
international law, not only to traverse international waters, but even 
to mount surveillance on the warships of another country within that 
country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 251   In the “Cowpens 
                                                 
250See Barren rocks, barren nationalism, THE ECONOMIST. Aug. 25, 2012, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21560882.   
251 An EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to a coastal state’s territorial sea.  In its EEZ, a 
coastal state has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent 
to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from 
the water, currents and winds.” See UNCLOS, arts. 55-56. At least some UNCLOS clauses, 
including “the institution of the exclusive economic zone,” are considered to be customary 
international law. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 
I. C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 34.  For background on the negotiating history of the UNCLOS, see 
Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), 2014 I. C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 115-16, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/137/17930.pdf.  For the differing views of the effect of 
UNCLOS (or the customary law rules it is said to include) with regard to foreign warships 
in a state’s EEZ, see Erik Franckx, American and Chinese Views of Navigational Rights of 
Warships, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law 187 (2011); Erik Slavin, Analysts: US, 
China Legal Views make more ‘Cowpens incidents’ likely, STARS AND STRIPES Dec. 19, 
2013, available at http://www.stripes.com/news/analysts-china-us-legal-views-make-more-
cowpens-incidents-likely-1.258357 (stating that the United States legal position is that 
Navy may conduct surveillance and other operations in international waters even within 
200 nautical miles of another nation; China and about 25 other nations dissent from that 
view).   
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incident” of 2013, a United States Navy Aegis cruiser, the Cowpens, 
was tracking a Chinese naval strike group including China’s sole 
aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in international waters in the South 
China Sea.  Reportedly, one of the ships in the Chinese group 
abruptly swerved onto the Cowpens’ path, risking a collision and 
forcing the Cowpens to make a radical maneuver to avoid ramming 
it.  The United States Navy insisted after the incident (through 
Admiral Samuel Locklear, head of the Pacific Command) that the 
avoidance maneuver should not be taken as a precedent, and that the 
United States “will operate freely in international waters . . . That’s 
the bottom line.  We will operate there.”252  But if the United States 
asserts the right of its warships to operate freely in international 
waters in the South China Sea, it must necessarily concede the same 
right to the warships of other naval powers.  
Part of the answer, however, may be for the three Great 
Powers concerned to seek a decision by the UN Security Council, 
acting under its Chapter VII authority, to ban other States’ warships 
from the area, with whatever limited exceptions might be applicable.  
The Council could also authorize the United States, Chinese and 
Japanese navies to eject any forbidden foreign warships from the 
waters, by force if necessary.253  Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, 
Member States have agreed “to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council.”254  And although a Security Council decision 
authorizing interference with the passage of warships through the 
South China Sea would likely conflict with the general international 
law of the sea, Art. 103 of the UN Charter provides that “In the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.” Assuming, then, that the Council has 
authority under Chapter VII to order the waters demilitarized (in 
                                                 
252 French, supra note 94, at 99.   
253 Compare S.C. Res. 665 ¶ 1 (1990) (in which the Council “[c]alls upon those Member 
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces 
to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be 
necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward 
maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to 
ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in 
resolution 661 (1990).”). 
254 On the legally binding character of Security Council decisions, see Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J 
Rep. 16, 53-54, ¶¶ 115-16 (June 21). 
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order to prevent threats to or breaches of the peace in the area), and 
assuming too that no P5 Council member would veto the proposed 
Resolution and that the affirmative votes for it are sufficient, this 
could be at least an interim legal solution.  Alternatively, the United 
States, China and Japan could seek to obtain voluntary agreements 
from other powers to respect the demilitarized zone by limiting or 
prohibiting entry into the zone by their naval forces.   
In addition to the problems already identified (and they are 
substantial), other problems surely remain, and would have to be 
negotiated through.  How, for example, should the parties deal with 
a situation like that of the Chinese interdiction of the USNS 
Impeccable in 2009? 255  The Impeccable, though owned by the 
United States Government and controlled by the Department of 
Defense, was operated by a private company.  It was gathering 
intelligence inside China’s EEZ near a Chinese submarine base 
when intercepted and forced to retreat by Chinese vessels.  The 
incident caused recriminations on the part of the two nations 
affected:  China claimed that the United States could not collect 
intelligence information by conducting operations inside its EEZ 
with its permission; the United States maintained that international 
law permitted it to engage in such activities in international waters.  
Should naval demilitarization include ships operated by private 
contractors on behalf of national militaries?  And should 
intelligence gathering (or espionage) be among the activities 
precluded by any demilitarization agreement?  Answering questions 
such as these would no doubt entail difficult bargaining, and it 
cannot be assumed that they would be resolved satisfactorily to all.   
More importantly, as with White’s “Concert” proposal, all 
three of the United States, China and Japan would stand to gain (if 
also to lose) from this proposal.  The United States would lose its 
current naval dominance in the region—but would be assured that 
the Chinese Navy would not contest its supremacy and eventually 
oust it.  China would abandon any hope it may be entertaining of 
securing dominance—but it would no longer leave the United States 
Navy in a position to disrupt its supply of Middle Eastern oil, or to 
choke off its sea trade.  Japan would also be relieved of the risk that 
China would someday control the sea routes that are as critical to its 
survival as they are to China’s.  And in order to ensure that each of 
the three responsible Parties had the opportunity to test the proposal 
                                                 
255 For an account of this episode, see Hayton, supra note 94, at 209-11. 
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and see if it worked satisfactorily, a sunset provision—say, ten 
years—could be added, subject to indefinite renewal.   
Despite the potential upside for the United States, however, 
it might well be the case that United States Navy strategists would 
consider the proposed bargain a poor one.  As one well-informed 
analyst explains: 
 
Moving warships and forces between the western 
United States and Asia requires freedom of 
navigation through the Pacific, the South China Sea, 
the Malacca Straits and the Indian Ocean.  Going 
through Indonesia’s internal waters, or between 
Indonesia and Australia, is navigationally and 
politically challenging, and heading south, around 
Australia, adds weeks to the journey to the Persian 
Gulf and, for a large fleet, tens of millions of dollars 
in extra fuel costs.  If the EEZs were closed to 
military vessels the U.S. would lose access to its 
bases and allies around Asia.  With the U.S. Navy at 
bay, Taiwan’s defensive position would be severely 
weakened.  Other East and Southeast Asian 
countries might feel similarly compromised.  U.S. 
influence in Southeast Asia could drain away.256    
 
To be sure, this scenario depicts the situation in which the 
United States Navy is ejected from the EEZs of Southeast Asia 
without any compensating limit on China’s ability to project naval 
power there.  Nonetheless, some of the difficulties envisaged, such 
as the greater difficulty of reaching the Persian Gulf, would remain. 
Furthermore, demilitarization would have to be accompanied 
with a settlement of competing claims to the seabed resources, and 
China might well be unwilling to compromise on its claims.  The 
Chinese government might well consider that it will soon be able to 
deploy its military and naval strength in the region to capture all of 
the resources it covets, denying Vietnamese and Filipino claims in 
their entirety.  Or Chinese strategic planners might actually want an 
                                                 
256 Hayton, supra note 94, at 213. See Patrick M. Cronin, America Must Take a Stand in 
the South China Sea, THE NATIONAL INTEREST Sept. 5, 2015, available at 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/america-must-take-stand-the-south-china-sea-
13779?page=3 (vigorously arguing that the US should strengthen its naval presence in the 
South China Sea – and be prepared to use it against China).   
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international incident or even a short, sharp war, from which 
Vietnam, the Philippines, or even the United States, emerged the 
loser.  On the other hand, overt military conflict with weaker South 
Asian nations could do severe damage to China’s international 
reputation.  Vietnam, at least, is in a position to make any Chinese 
military victory a costly one.  If the United States became involved, 
the strategic stakes would rise dramatically for China.  A military 
victory would not be assured, and anything short of an unambiguous 
victory might damage the CPC’s standing in the eyes of the Chinese 
population.  China might well find it attractive to be seen as a 
responsible stakeholder and reliable partner in international affairs, 
as well as gaining much in both economic and security terms from 
the proposed bargain.  
In short, the proposal advanced here undoubtedly raises 
poses painful choices for all three nations concerned, not least the 
United States.  And American decision-makers (or Chinese, or 
Japanese) might well consider the costs and risks to be too high.  
Nonetheless, the potential rewards are inestimable:  a generation or 
longer of peace in East Asia; an opportunity for China’s economic 
expansion to continue; a protracted period in which China, its 
neighbors, and the United States could gradually adjust to China’s 
rise; and perhaps a new confidence on China’s part that it could 
occupy its rightful “place in the sun”257 without provoking war in its 
region.   
 
Conclusion 
The histories of both the Concert of Europe and the Concert 
of North America point to the same conclusions.  A concert system 
arises out of a major, counter-hegemonic war, and persists for about 
a generation, or for as long as the threat of the defeated hegemon’s 
revival is still felt.  As the memories of the war vanish and the threat 
recedes, the concert system weakens, tending to revert to a balance 
of power instead.  And the ensuing balance of power is itself fragile, 
likely to be disrupted by another major war among the erstwhile 
concert members.   
If this analysis is right, then a Concert of Asia is exceedingly 
unlike to arise before a major, counter-hegemonic war.  Yet the very 
                                                 
257 See Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, Speech to the North German Regatta Association 
(1901), available at http://www.southalabama.edu/history/faculty/faust/ 
Wilhelm%20II%20place%20in%20the%20sun.htm (“in spite of the fact that we have no 
such fleet as we should have, we have conquered for ourselves a place in the sun.”). 
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purpose of White’s proposal was to head off such a war.  The peace 
of East Asia, if it holds at all, will thus more likely be kept in place 
by a balance of powers, not a balance of rights.  At best, we may be 
at the start of the Second Cold War.258  At worst, we may see a Great 
Power war in East Asia in the foreseeable future. 
These pessimistic conclusions should be tempered, however, 
by the possibility that confidence-building measures well short of a 
full Concert system could, perhaps, be implemented, and that once 
in place, it might be followed by other similar co-operative 
measures.  Here it has been proposed that the United States, China 
and Japan consider a proposal to demilitarize the South China Sea, 
in the hopes of relieving tensions in that area, reducing the 
likelihood of regional armed conflict, securing the seaway to all 
parties and, eventually, compromising claims to that Sea’s natural 
resources.
                                                 
258 See Posner & Yoo, supra note 142, at 15. 
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